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Abstract
Although the market for biometric technologies is expanding, the existing biometric sys-
tems present still some issues that the research community has to address. In particular,
in adverse environmental conditions (e.g., low quality biometric signals), where the error
rates increase, it is necessary to create more robust and dependable systems. In the lit-
erature on biometrics, the integration of multiple biometric sources has been successfully
used to improve the recognition accuracy of the unimodal biometric systems. Multibio-
metric systems, by exploiting more information, such as dierent biometric traits, multiple
samples, multiple algorithms, make more reliable the biometric authentication. Benets of
multibiometrics depend on the diversity among the component matchers and also, on the
competence of each one of them. In non-controlled conditions of data acquisition, there
is a degradation of biometric signal quality that often causes a signicant deterioration of
recognition performance. It is intuitive the concept that, the classier having the higher
quality is more credible than a classier operating on noisy data. Then, researchers started
to propose quality-based fusion schemes, where the quality measures of the samples have
been incorporated in the fusion to improve performance. Another promising direction in
multibiometrics is to estimate the decision reliability of the component modality matcher
1
2based on the matcher output itself. An interesting open research issue concerns how to
estimate the decision reliability and how to exploit this information in a fusion scheme.
From a security perspective, a multimodal system appears more protected than its uni-
modal components, since spoong two or more modalities is harder than spoong only one.
However, since a multimodal system involves dierent biometric traits, it oers a higher
number of vulnerable points that may be attacked by a hacker who may choice to fake only
a subset of them. Recently, researchers investigated if a multimodal system can be deceived
by spoong only a subset but not all the fused modalities. The goal of this thesis is to
improve the performance of the existing integration mechanisms in presence of degraded
data and their security in presence of spoof attacks. Our contribution concerns three im-
portant issues: 1) Reducing verication errors of a fusion scheme at score level based on
the statistical Likelihood Ratio test, by adopting a sequential test and, when the number of
training samples is limited, a voting strategy. 2) Addressing the problem of identication
errors, by setting up a predictor of errors. The proposed predictor exploits ranks and scores
generated by the identication operation and can be eectively applied in a multimodal
scenario. 3) Improving the security of the existing multibiometric systems against spoof
attacks which involve some but not all the fused modalities. Firstly, we showed that in such
a real scenario performance of the system dramatically decrease. Then, for the ngerprint
modality, we proposed a novel liveness detection algorithm which combines perspiration-
and morphology-based static features. Finally, we demonstrated that, by incorporating our
algorithm in the fusion scheme, the multimodal system results robust in presence of spoof
attacks.
Quelli che s'innamoran di pratica sanza
scienza son come il nocchiere, ch'entra
in navilio sanza timone o bussola, che
mai ha certezza dove si vada.
Leonardo
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Biometric Recognition
The authentication process determines or veries the identity of an individual. It assumes
signicant importance in high security applications, such as logical access to personal com-
puters, cellular phone, ATMs, or physical access to buildings, border crossing [63]. Tradi-
tionally, to ensure that only authorized users access to the protected services, possession-
based (badges) or knowledge-based (passwords) solutions have been adopted. However,
when a password is divulged to an unauthorized user or a badge is stolen by an impostor,
these authentication schemes may be deceived. Vulnerabilities of such schemes are being
addressed by the emergence of biometric systems which establish the identity of an individ-
ual based on what the person is, rather than what the person carries or remembers [45].
The identity of an individual is encoded by dierent biometric traits, such as ngerprints,
hand geometry, iris, retina, face, hand vein, facial thermograms, signature, voiceprint, gait,
palmprint, referred to as biometric modalities (see Fig.1.1).
The biometric recognition process involves rstly the acquisition of biometric data and
3
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Figure 1.1: Examples of some of the biometric traits used for authenticating an individual.
the extraction of features from the acquired data, then the comparison of these features to
the feature set previously stored in the database, referred to as template.
A biometric system may operate in the two modes:
 Biometric identity verication
 Biometric identication
In the verication mode, the system has to verify the authenticity of a claimed identity,
while in the identication mode it has to assign the correct identity label to one person out
of a watch-list [32].
A typical biometric system is composed by four main modules:
1. Sensor Module, which denes the interaction of an individual with the system by
capturing his biometric data.
2. Feature Extraction Module, which extracts feature values from the acquired data.
During enrollment, the extracted feature set, referred to as template, is stored in the
Chapter 1. Introduction 5
database and it represents the identity of a subject.
3. Matching Module, which compares the feature vector extracted from the query to the
template. The match score determines the amount of similarity (similarity score) or
distance (distance score) between the feature set of enrolled template and the query
data. The matching is 1:1 to verify a claimed identity, while it is 1:N to determine an
identity.
4. Decision-making Module, which accepts or rejects the user's claimed identity based
on the matching score generated in the matching module, in the verication task or
declares the user's identity based on the best match score, in the identication task
(see Fig.1.5).
1.1.1 Performance Evaluation
The feature set extracted from the probe biometric data does not exactly correspond to the
template, and subsequently, the matching process is never perfect. This variation may be
due to several factors such as non-controlled sensing conditions, changes of the biometric
characteristic, etc. This aspect clearly impacts on the performance of a biometric system
which never achieves a perfect recognition where the accuracy is 100%.
Two types of errors can be made by a biometric verication system:
 TypeI, False Rejection. It occurs when an authorized user is wrongly rejected by the
system.
 TypeII, False Acceptance. It occurs when an impostor is wrongly accepted by the
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system. This error is very costly.
Performance is evaluated in terms of False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection
Rate (FRR), where FAR is usually xed by the specic application.
The two errors are complementary, trying to lower one of them by varying the threshold,
the other error rate automatically increases. Biometric verication looks for the best trade-
o between these two types of errors. The Equal Error Rate (EER) point is obtained
when FAR and FRR coincide. The complete performance curve which represents the full
capabilities of the system at dierent operating points, is given by the Receiver or also
Relative Operating Characteristic (ROC) plot, in which FAR is a function of FRR (see
Fig.??). A common variant of this, is the Detection Error Tradeo (DET) plot which is
obtained using normal deviate scales on both axes. (see Fig.1.4).
Ranking capabilities of an identication system are evaluated using the Cumulative
Match Curve (CMC) (see Fig.1.3). While the ROC curve plots the FAR of a 1:1 matcher,
CMC represents a measure of 1:N identication system performance [5].
1.1.2 Limitations of unibiometrics
Most of the biometric systems, deployed in real world applications requiring a high security
level, for authentication rely on the evidence of a single biometric source (e.g. ngerprint,
face, voice etc.) [38]. Although if the biometric technique is becoming popular, there are still
a variety of vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. Some of the challenges are described
below:
Susceptibility to noise. Noisy input biometric data may be not accurately matched with the
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Figure 1.2: ROC curve for a ngerprint modality taken from Nist database.
templates, and subsequently, this may lead to a false rejection.
Non-universality. A particular biometric trait may not be possessed by a subset of the
users; this may cause an increase of the enrollment failure rate.
Distinctiveness. A single biometric trait is expected to vary signicantly across dierent
subjects; however, there may be a large similarity among the values of features used to
represent that trait [61].
Intra-class variations. The matching process may be aected by a signicant variation
between the biometric data acquired at authentication time and that one used to generate
the template.
Spoong. A biometric system may be circumvented by presenting a fake biometric trait to
the sensor [23].
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Figure 1.3: CMC curve for a ngerprint modality taken from WVU database. The con-
sidered probe (the fourth one) is not very similar to the gallery sample. This impacts the
unimodal identication performance.
Examples of application of biometric technologies are showed in Fig.1.6.
1.2 Multibiometrics
The latest researches indicate that using a combination of biometric modalities, the human
identication is more reliable [24]. Several works in the literature on biometrics demon-
strate the eciency of the multimodal fusion to enhance performance and reliability of the
automatic recognition [61]. In particular, the work [64] shows the merit of both multimodal
and intramodal fusion, and [31] demonstrates the eectiveness of using quality measures in
the fusion. Integrating biometric information from multiple sources, multimodal biometric
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Figure 1.4: DET curve for a ngerprint modality taken from Nist database.
systems are able to improve the authentication performance, increase the population cov-
erage, oer user choice, make biometric authentication systems more reliable and robust to
spoong [29].
However, the benets of multibiometrics depend on the accuracy, complementarity, re-
liability and quality measurement of their component biometric experts. Moreover, when
designing a multibiometric system, several factors should be considered. These concern
the choice and the number of biometric traits, the level of integration and the mechanism
adopted to consolidate the information provided by multiple traits.
 Fusion at match score level is usually preferred due to the easy to access and combine
the scores presented by dierent modalities.
 The parallel fusion strategy has been extensively explored, however serial and hybrid
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Figure 1.5: The sensor acquires the biometric data of a user from which a representative
feature set is extracted. This feature set is matched against the feature set stored in the
database of the system. The decision taken by the system is based on the match scores
generated during the matching process [21]. In an identication system, these scores are
transformed to ranks in order to determine potential matching identities.
architectures present important advantages. In particular, the serial fusion considers
the biometric matchers one at a time, and makes a reliable decision by employing few
experts and activating the remaining experts only for dicult cases.
In general, it is desirable that a fusion scheme involves statistically independent modality
matchers. In a multimodal fusion, the set of expert outputs is expected to be statistically
independent, while in intramodal fusion, where the component matchers rely on the same
biometric trait, a high dependency is expected among the expert outputs [55].
1.2.1 Challenges and Dicult in Multibiometrics
Error Rates
Although individual modalities have proven to be reliable in ideal environments, they can be
very sensitive to real environmental conditions. In real scenarios, it is dicult to acquire high
quality samples, then biometric authentication errors are inevitable [17]. The performance
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Figure 1.6: 1) Fingerprint sensors installed on a keyboard (the Cherry Biometric Keyboard
and on a mouse (the ID Mouse manufactured by Siemens). 2) A border passage system
using iris recognition (at London's Heathrow airport).
of several current unimodal systems is reported in Fig.1.7.
The impact of adverse environmental conditions on the characteristics of the collected
biometric data can be quantied by quality measures. It is evident that, a degradation in the
quality level of the biometric signal input may aect the reliability of the matching process.
The performance of the single modality matcher may change as the data quality changes and
dierent modality matchers are sensitive to dierent aspects of the signal quality. Then, the
opinion of a matcher in the decision of the ensemble have to be appropriately weighted, by
assigning a higher weight to the matcher with higher quality data. The same observation has
to be considered for the reliability, accuracy and competence of each component matcher.
From the viewpoint of a human observer, a sample of good quality may be a ngerprint
image with a good contrast and clear ridges. However, if only few minutiae points can be
detected, a matcher based on minutiae will be not eective [19], (see 1.9). This can happen,
for example, in presence of cuts on a nger, (see Fig.1.8), which alters the ridge structure
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Figure 1.7: Unimodal error rates associated with ngerprint, face, and voice biometric
systems [25]. FNMR indicates False Non-matched Rate (FRR) while FMR indicates False
Matched Rate (FAR).
of the ngerprints resulting in less eciency of the matching process.
Figure 1.8: A ngerprint image when the presence of minor cuts alters the ridge structure.
Figure 1.9: Quality measures for ngerprint images input for a minutiae-based matcher.
The quality of collected biometric samples can signicantly vary, due to the intrinsic
variability of behavioral factors and to the not always well-controlled acquisition conditions.
For example, a visible-light face image may change by varying the illumination conditions,
facial expressions, makeup, etc. (see Fig.1.10), while a ngerprint image may be aected
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by factors like humidity and ambient temperature.
Figure 1.10: An example of a face image acquired in adverse conditions, taken from BANCA
database.
Spoof Attacks
A hacker may gain an unauthorized access by exploring several points of a biometric system.
The main vulnerabilities are shown in Fig. 1.11). For example, an impostor may attack
the server where the templates are stored by introducing his own template. In this thesis,
we focus on attacks at sensor level, where articially created ngers are presented during
authentication.
Previous studies [70] have shown that it is not dicult to create fake ngers using
play-doh, gelatin and silicon based on molds of latent ngerprints (see Fig.1.12 and 1.13).
An example of live and spoof ngerprint is shown in Fig.1.14.
The treat of spoong, where an impostor fakes a biometric trait, has encouraged the use
of multimodal biometric systems. However, multimodal systems are not more secure than
their unimodal systems alone since the use of multiple modalities oers more vulnerable
points to a hacker. The security risk in multimodal systems due to spoof attacks has been
evaluated under the assumption that an impostor must fake all the fused modalities to be
accepted. However, a malicious user may attack only one or a subset of modalities in the
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Figure 1.11: Vulnerable points of attacks in a biometric system [12].
system.
Other Issues
Multibiometric systems are still rarely used in real applications since combining multiple
traits induces some drawbacks as the increase in complexity of the overall system. Moreover,
a multibiometric system is expected to have a higher cost, a longer authentication time and
a lower user convenience with respect to its unimodal component. Thus, in the evaluation
these aspects have to be take into account.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
1.3.1 Improvement of Performance
Reducing verication errors of a score level fusion scheme based on the Likelihood Ratio
(LR)-test statistic. Due to the diversity of scenarios, the use of a single rule may be
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Figure 1.12: Examples of some inexpensive materials employed for creating articial nger-
print (Play-Doh and Silicon).
Figure 1.13: Use of gelatin to make a fake ngerprint.
not always ecient, thus we adopted two schemes: i) a sequential fusion technique in
conjunction with a majority voting strategy to improve the performance of a framework
based on LR test; ii) a LR-based voting strategy alone, when the number of training
samples is limited.
The sequential fusion strategy considers unimodal systems sequentially, so the decision
can be made by employing as fewer systems as possible. In this mechanism, the induced cost
of the multimodal system increases with its security level, as required by the application.
The component systems are sorted in a decreasing order of condence.
Addressing the problem of identication errors by setting up a predictor of errors. The pro-
posed predictor exploits ranks and scores generated by the identication operation and can
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Figure 1.14: An example of live and fake (gummy) ngerprint image.
be eectively applied in a multimodal scenario. The motivation for using reliability infor-
mation in fusion emerged in relation to multimodal biometric systems, where the modalities
performing poorly as a results of degraded quality of biometric information or a low com-
petence of a single matcher should inuence the nal decision. This suggested a reliability
dependent weighting of modalities as solution to the fusion problem. The idea is to combine
multiple independent modalities which are not degraded, so the system will oer a more
robust authentication in adverse conditions. In a fusion mechanism, it is necessary to take
into account the fact that individual decisions depend on the acquisition condition of the
data presented to the expert as much as they depend on the discriminating skills of the
classier.
1.3.2 Improvement of Security
Improving the security of the existing multibiometric systems against spoof attacks. We
demonstrated that there is a signicant security risk where only a subset of the modalities
used in the system are spoofed. We experimentally showed that, in such a real scenario, the
performance of the score sum scheme and of the statistic Likelihood Ratio test decreases in
presence of spoong. For the ngerprint modality, we proposed a novel liveness detection
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algorithm which combines perspiration- and morphology-based static features. Further, we
demonstrated that, by incorporating our algorithm in the fusion scheme, the multimodal
system results robust in presence of spoof attacks involving a only subset but not all fused
modalities.
The eld of combining classiers is like
a teenager: full of energy, enthusiasm,
spontaneity, and confusion.
Ludmila Kuncheva
Chapter 2
Information Fusion in Biometrics
2.1 Multiple Biometric Sources of Information
Classier combination may involve a set of classiers where all the components use the
same representation of the input pattern or each one of them can use its own representation
[28]. In the context of biometrics, information fusion concerns the consolidation of evidence
provided by multiple biometric sources in order to output a decision [60]. These biometric
sources of information may be derived from the same biometric or dierent biometric traits
(see Fig.2.1). In presence of multiple sensors (e.g., capacitive and optical ngerprint sen-
sors), multiple instances (e.g., multiple face images captured under dierent poses), multiple
representations (e.g., texture- and minutiae-based), multiple units (e.g., right eye and left
eye), the information is derived from a single biometric modality, while in presence of multi-
ple traits (e.g., iris, face and ngerprint) the information is derived from dierent biometric
modalities [61]. A multimodal system where dierent traits are fused, is expected to be
more robust to noisy data, non-universality, provide higher accuracy and protection against
spoof attacks. Exploiting multiple traits can signicantly enhance the recognition accuracy
18
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[63]. Further, physically uncorrelated modalities (e.g., ngerprint and iris) are expected to
result in a better performance improvement than that achieved by fusing correlated traits
(e.g., voice and lip movement).
Figure 2.1: Dierent sources of biometric information which can be fused.
Besides enhancing matching accuracy, there are several advantages of multibiometric
systems over traditional unibiometric systems [59].
 Multibiometric systems address the issue of nonuniversality (i.e., limited population
coverage) encountered by unibiometric systems. They guarantee a certain degree of
exibility during the user's enrollment since he can use several dierent traits (e.g.,
face, voice, ngerprint, iris, hand). Based on the nature of the application and the
convenience of the user, only a subset of these traits (e.g., face and voice) is requested
Chapter 2. Information Fusion in Biometrics 20
during authentication.
 It makes dicult for an impostor to spoof multiple biometric traits of a legitimately
enrolled individual. Furthermore, by asking the user to present a random subset of
traits at the point of acquisition, a multibiometric system ensures that the system is
interacting with a live user.
 When recognition has to take place in adverse conditions where certain biometric
traits cannot be reliably extracted. For example, in the presence of ambient acoustic
noise, when an voice characteristics of an individual cannot be accurately measured,
then the authentication may be based on the ngerprint.
 Multibiometrics help also in applications where a continuous tracking of an individual
is needed, a single trait is not sucient.
 Amultibiometric system may also be viewed as a fault tolerant system which continues
to operate even when certain biometric sources become unreliable due to sensor or
software malfunctioning. The notion of fault tolerance is especially useful in large-
scale authentication systems involving a large number of subjects (such as a border
control application), where the distributions of the subjects may overlap.
2.2 Dierent levels to make Fusion
The key to create a secure multimodal biometric system is in how the information from
dierent modalities is fused, (see Fig. 2.2) [61]. The consolidation of biometric information
can be performed at various levels: sensor level, feature extraction level, match score level,
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rank level (identication operation) and decision level. An additional post-matching fusion
level, which we will not be analyzed in this thesis, regards the dynamic classier selection
scheme, which chooses the results of the modality matcher with highest probability to
output a correct decision about the input pattern [48]. Consolidating data at an early stage
of the recognition process involves a higher informative contain concerning the biometric
input. Thus, it is potentially able to provide better recognition results, but in practice
concatenating data at a level before matching may result dicult or not possible. When the
information fusion is performed at sensor level, raw data from dierent sensors are combined.
For example, the ngerprint images taken from dierent sensors are combined to form a
single ngerprint image (ngerprint mosaicking). However, images captured from sensors
with a dierent resolution are not compatible. Fusion at feature level is dicult since the
features vectors to be fused may be not compatible (e.g., ngerprint minutiae and eigenface
coecients) and not accessible (feature sets can be proprietary). When the output of each
biometric matcher is a subset of possible matches sorted in decreasing order of condence,
the fusion can be done at the rank level. Each possible match is assigned the highest
(minimum) rank as computed by dierent matchers. Ties are broken randomly to arrive at
a strict ranking order and the nal decision is made based on the combined ranks. Fusion
at decision level involves only a limited amount of information since each biometric matcher
individually decides about which is the best match based on the biometric input presented
to it. Combining match scores provided from dierent matchers is the most eective fusion
strategy because they oer the best trade-o between the informative contain and the ease
to implement the fusion.
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Figure 2.2: Levels of fusion in biometrics.
2.2.1 Match Score Information
Match scores are commonly used to consolidate the decisions rendered by multiple biometric
classiers since they are easy to access and to combine. However, the scores output by
dierent biometric matchers may not be homogeneous, can conform to dierent scales. For
example, face matcher may output a distance measure while ngerprint matcher may output
a similarity measure. Further, they may follow dierent statistical distributions [61]. Thus,
before integration, match scores must be transformed into a common domain via score
normalization. Choosing an eective normalization scheme is a critical part in the design
to combine dierent matchers. It refers to changing the location and scale parameters
of the match score distributions outputs of the individual matchers [21] [6]. For a good
normalization scheme, the location and scale parameters of match score distributions must
be robust and ecient [48]. Many methods for score normalization have been proposed [22],
and fusion rules performance changes by varying the technique. The technique adopted in
our fusion framework is the min-max, which retains the original distribution of scores except
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a scaling factor and transform the scores to a common range of zero to one, based on the
minimum and the maximum score values (see Fig. 2.3). Given a set of matching scores sk,
Figure 2.3: Distributions of genuine and impostor match scores after min-max normalization
for ngerprint modality [48].
k = 1 : : :K, the normalized scores are given by (2.1).
sk =
sk  min
max min (2.1)
The most commonly used score normalization technique is the z-score, which exploits the
average score and the score variations of each matcher. The normalized scores are given by
(2.2).
sk =
sk   

(2.2)
A technique which presents high eciency and robustness is the tanh. The normalized
scores are given by (2.3).
sk =
1
2
ftanh (0:01(sk   GH
GH
)) + 1g (2.3)
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where GH and GH are the mean and standard deviation of the genuine score distribution
as given by Hampel.
Median normalization is a robust technique which is not sensitive to the points compos-
ing the tails of the score distributions. The normalized scores are given by (2.8).
sk =
sk  median(sk)
MAD
(2.4)
where MAD = median(jsk  median(sk)j) This scheme does not retain the input distribu-
tions (see Fig. 2.4). The main drawback appears in presence of score distributions which are
not Gaussian, since median cannot be accurately estimated. When the scores of dierent
Figure 2.4: Distributions of genuine and impostor match scores after median-MAD normal-
ization for ngerprint modality [48].
matchers are on a logarithmic scale, applying decimal scale can be useful. The scheme is
the following (2.5), where n = log 10maxsk
sk =
sk
10n
(2.5)
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2.2.2 Rank Information
At the rank level, each biometric matcher orders the candidate identities in the gallery
according to their similarities to the given probe and transforms this ordering into a set of
N integer values or ranks. A fusion scheme at this level consolidates the rankings provided
by multiple biometric matchers in order to obtain a consensus rank for each identity in the
gallery [61]. If we consider an input image having low quality, the genuine score as well as
the impostor scores are likely to be low [44] [66]. The use of such a score (for a genuine
user) during the fusion process may confuse a fusion algorithm. The rank, on the other
hand, is a relatively stable statistic and does not require normalization; combining this
rank with other ranks (for the genuine class) in a judicious manner can result in a correct
classication.
2.2.3 Hybrid Rank-Score Information
The use of both ranks and match scores [6] is expected to be more reliable and has been
demonstrated to increase the recognition accuracy of a multibiometric system [49]. For a
given probe image, a N  C score matrix S = [sik] can be generated where sik represents
the similarity score computed by the kth modality matcher Ck after comparing the probe
against the ith entry in the gallery database, i = 1 : : : N and k = 1 : : : C. For each modality,
the corresponding scores can be sorted in decreasing order. So a NC rank matrix R = [rik]
can be generated where rik is the rank assigned to the i
th identity in the database by the
matcher Ck. Thus, the output of each matcher, Ck, can be viewed as a two-tupled entry
(sik; rik), i = 1 : : : N , (see Fig.2.5).
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Figure 2.5: Fusing face and ngerprint biometric systems at hybrid rank-score level.
So, the information presented by multiple traits may be consolidated at various levels
of recognition process. At feature extraction level, a new feature set is produced by fusing
the features sets of multiple modalities, and this new feature set is used in the matching
module. At match score level, the scores produced by multiple matchers are integrated,
while at decision level the decisions made by the individual systems are combined. The
integration at feature extraction level is expected to perform better, but the feature space
of dierent biometric traits may not be compatible and most commercial systems do not
provide access to information at this level. So, researchers found at score level a good
compromise between the ease in realizing the fusion and the information content.
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2.3 Post-matching Fusion Approaches
2.3.1 Fusion Approaches at match score-level
Fusion at match score level concerns combining the match scores generated by multiple
classiers in order to make a decision about the identity of the subject. In literature, the
fusion at score level is performed by employing dierent approaches [46] based on dierent
models [63].
1. Classier-based schemes. The model is a classier which is trained using a feature
vector composed by the scores output by the matchers to be fused [37]. This is ac-
curate to correctly discriminate between genuine and impostor classes, regardless of
the non-homogeneity of the score, but it typically requires a large training set. In
particular, the case when the scores output by dierent matchers are conicting, in
absence of sucient training samples may be not well represented in the training data,
resulting in incorrect decision. Wang et al. used Fisher's discriminant analysis and
a neural network classier with radial basis function employing a two-dimensional
feature vector composed by iris and face scores [77]. Ross and Jain used linear dis-
criminant classiers and Decision Tree to combine ngerprint, face and hand-geometry
scores [61]. A Support Vector Machine was used to combine face and speech scores
by Sanderson [65].
2. Transformation-based schemes. In situations where it is not possible to acquire a
large number of labeled multibiometric data in an operational environment, it may
be convenient to directly combine the match scores without interpreting them in
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a probabilistic framework [62]. The match scores provided by dierent matchers
are rstly transformed into a common domain (score normalization), then they are
combined using a simple fusion rule. This approach is quite complex since it implicates
a wide experimental analysis to choose the best normalization scheme and combination
weights for the specic dataset of interest. The model is based on a normalization
function. The operators which are commonly used in the literature are min, max,
median,weighted sum and weighted product, dened by (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), (2.9) and
(2.10).
smin = min
k
sk (2.6)
smax = max
k
sk (2.7)
smedian = medianksk (2.8)
ssum =
KX
k=1
wksk (2.9)
sprod =
KY
k=1
swkk (2.10)
where wk are parameters that need to be estimated. The simple sum operator (or
mean) is a special case of weighted sum with w = 1N , while the product operator is
a special case of weighted product with w = 1. The operators which do not contain
parameters to be tuned, are known as xed combiners [53]. Based on experimental
results, researchers agree that xed rules usually perform well for ensemble of classi-
ers having similar performance, while trained rules handle better matchers having
dierent accuracy. Thus, when fusing dierent modalities, individual matchers often
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exhibit dierent performance, then for this problem trained rules should perform bet-
ter than xed rules [58]. It has been shown that, the simple sum rule gives very good
accuracy in combining multiple biometric systems [58].
3. Density-based schemes. The model is built by estimating density functions for the
genuine and impostor score distributions [74]. The match scores are considered as
random variables, whose class conditional densities are not a priori known [13]. So,
this approach requires an explicit estimation of density functions from the training
data [63]. A recent method belonging to this category is the score fusion framework
based on the Likelihood Ratio test, proposed by Nandakumar et al. in [46]. It models
the scores of a biometric matcher by a mixture of Gaussians and perform a statistical
test to discriminate between genuine and impostor classes. This framework produces
high recognition rates at a chosen operating point (in terms of False Acceptance Rate),
without the need of parameter tuning by the system designer once the method for score
density estimation has been dened. Optimal performance, in fact, can be achieved
when it is possible to perform accurate estimations of the genuine and impostor score
densities. The Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) lets to obtain reliable estimations of
the distributions, even if the amount of data needed for it increases as the number of
considered biometrics increases.
Let s = [s1; s2; :::; sK ] denote the scores emitted by multiple matchers, with sk rep-
resenting the match score of the kth matcher, k = 1; :::;K. Adopting the Bayesian
decision rule, the probability of error can be minimized.
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Assign s to genuine if P (genuinejs) is greater or equal to P (impostorjs). The a
posterior probability P (genuinejs) can be derived from the class-conditional density
functions P (sjgenuine) using the Bayes formula [62]:
P (genuinejs) = P (sjgenuine)P (genuine)/P (s)
Moreover, as noted by the authors in [46], the performance of their method can be
improved by using a suitable quality measure together with each score. Most of
the available biometric systems, however, do not provides such measures. The main
drawback of a likelihood ratio fusion rule is that performance can be aected by
inaccurate estimations of the density functions.
Due to the diversity of scenarios encountered in the datasets, training and using a
single fusion rule on the entire dataset may not be appropriate. Recently [74], the idea of
dynamically selecting biometric fusion algorithms has been adopted.
2.3.2 Fusion Approaches at Rank-Level
For systems operating in identication mode, rank level fusion is a viable option. It provides
a richer information into the decision-making process compared to the decision level, without
requiring a normalization phase before combining [1]. Let K be the number of matchers to
be fused and N the number of enrolled users. Let rij be the rank assigned to the j
th user
enrolled in the database by the ith matcher, i = 1 : : :K, and i = 1 : : : N , then Rij .
Highest rank scheme. For each subject, the combined rank is given by the lowest rank
(2.11). This rank fusion technique presents the advantage of utilizing the strength of each
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matcher.
Ri =
K
min
k=1
rik; i = 1; 2; :::N (2.11)
Borda Count scheme. For each subject, the combined rank is given by the sum of the
ranks assigned by the individual matchers (2.12). Such a rule presents the advantage of
taking into account the variability of the single matcher outputs. Its drawbacks lie in the
assumptions that, the matchers are statistically independent and they perform equally well.
This makes the Borda Count method highly vulnerable to the eect of weak classiers.
Ri =
KX
k=1
rik; i = 1; 2; :::N (2.12)
Logistic regression scheme. The fused rank is a weighted sum of the individual ranks.
Ri =
KX
k=1
wkrik; i = 1; 2; :::N (2.13)
The weight wk, i = 1 : : :K, (see equation (2.13)), is determined through a training phase
by logistic regression. This method is useful when the dierent biometric matchers have
signicant dierences in their accuracies [63].
There is increasing interest in impact of the matcher reliability estimation in the context
of fusion in biometrics. However, incorporating reliability information in rank level fusion
represents a topic whose the discussion in the literature is at present still limited. The idea
is to use reliability in a multibiometric system for reducing the weight of potential incorrect
unimodal decisions.
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2.3.3 Fusion Approaches at Hybrid Rank-Score Level
An interesting technique for the integration of multiple classiers at an hybrid rank-score
level is introduced using a HybridBF network. In [6] Falavigna and Brunelli showed that,
a system based on the integration of a visual and an acoustic subsystems achieves superior
performance compared to that of its components. The proposed approach reconstructs a
mapping from the set of scores and the corresponding ranks into a set 0,1. The matching
of the probe against each gallery identity is mapped to 1, if it corresponds to the correct
label, to 0 otherwise. The reconstruction of the mapping is formulated as a learning task
problem, where the training set is composed by non-matched and matched inputs and the
system will appropriately classify unseen data. This method has some drawbacks. Firstly,
a network-based framework requires a large amount of training examples to tune the free
parameters involved. Secondly, it requires the availability of all classiers. Finally, when a
new user is added, the network has to be trained again.
Recently, Nandakumar et al. [49] proposed a scheme that utilizes both ranks and scores
to perform fusion in identication systems. They dened a hybrid rank-score fusion rule
based on a combination of score and rank statistics, dened as indicated in the equation
(2.14).
Assign query to identity In if
Rn  Ri; i = 1; 2; :::N (2.14)
where the combined score and rank statistic is dened by equation (2.15).
Ri(S,R) = P (IijS)ri; i = 1; 2; :::N (2.15)
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in which P (IijS) is the posterior probability that Ii is the true identity given the score
matrix S, and ri is given by the equation (2.16) under the assumption that the matchers
are independent.
ri =
KY
k=1
Pkrik i = 1; 2; :::N (2.16)
This approach, however, requires an explicit estimation of the genuine and impostor
distributions, and a large dataset is required to accurately estimate the score distributions.
Summary
Multibiometric systems consolidate the evidence provided by multiple sources of biometric
information, and subsequently, they are able to improve recognition performance compared
to its unimodal components. In order to maximize the benets of multimodal biometric
systems, an eective fusion scheme is needed to consolidate the information provided by
dierent modalities. Among the possible integration levels, fusion at match score level is
the most commonly used, since scores are easy to access and to combine. However, they
are not homogeneous, then an ecient normalization phase is required before fusion. In
this chapter, we reported various normalization and integration schemes which have been
proposed in the biometric literature for multimodal biometric systems designing.
The state of mind which enables a man
to do work of this kind ...; the daily
eort comes from no deliberate
intention or program, but straight from
the heart.
Einstein
Chapter 3
Multibiometric Verication
Scenario
The goal of a multi-modal systems is to alleviate limitations of mono-modal systems, in
particular to reduce decision errors. Among the existing approaches for combining several
biometric traits, the fusion of match scores has been widely adopted. Recently, a scheme
using the Likelihood Ratio (LR) Test has been proposed. In such approach, the distributions
of genuine and impostor scores are modeled as a nite mixture of gaussians that can be
accurately estimated only in presence of a huge training set.
In this chapter, we proposed a solution to reduce some limitations of the existing density-
based approaches; in particular, we presented two novel score fusion strategies based on the
Likelihood Ratio test. We propose both a sequential test and a voting strategy. By using
them, on one hand we tried to implicitly use the quality information embedded into the
scores. On the other hand, we obtained a system that demonstrated to be more robust than
the original one with respect to the lack of data for training [40]. Our case study concerns
the combination of face and ngerprint recognition systems at score level, as shown in
34
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Fig.3.1.
Figure 3.1: Combination of face and ngerprint modalities.
3.1 The Likelihood Ratio Test
Nandakumar and Chen [46] formulate the problem of Identity Verication in terms of hy-
pothesis testing: let 	 denote a statistical test for deciding if the hypothesis H:fthe score
vector s belongs to the Genuine classg has been correctly formulated. The choice is based
on the value of the observed match score and it lies between only two decisions: accepting
H or rejecting it. As it is known [18], dierent tests should be compared with respect to
the concepts of size and power, that are respectively the probability of accepting H when
it is false (also called False Accept Rate - FAR) and the probability of accepting H when it
is true (also called Genuine Accept Rate - GAR) [18]. In the context of prudential decision
making [36], the NP lemma [18] recognizes that, in choosing between a hypothesis H and
an alternative, the test based on the Likelihood Ratio is the best because it maximizes the
Chapter 3. Multibiometric Verication Scenario 36
power for a xed size [18]. Let
LR(s) =
fgen(s)
fimp(s)
(3.1)
be the Likelihood Ratio (LR), that is the probability of the observed outcome under H
divided by the probability of assuming its alternative. As stated by the Neyman and
Pearson theorem [18], the framework proposed by Nandakumar and Jain ensures that the
most powerful test is the one, say 	(s), that satises the equations (1) for some 
	(s) =
8<:
1; when LR(s)  
0; when LR(s) < 
(3.2)
where s = [s1; s2; :::sK ] is an observed set of K match scores that is assigned to the genuine
class if LR(s) is greater than a xed threshold , with   0.
3.1.1 The Estimation of Match Score Densities
As it is known in biometric literature [63], it is hard to choose a specic parametric form
for approximating the density of genuine and impostor match scores, because the match
distributions have a large tail, discrete components and not only one mode.
Given a training set, density estimation can be done by employing parametric or non-
parametric techniques [4]. The non-parametric techniques do not assume any form of the
density function and are completely data-driven; on the contrary, parametric techniques
assume that the form of the density function is known (e.g., Gaussian) and estimate its
parameters from the training data. The power of this scheme resides in its generality
[14]: exactly the same procedure can be used also if the known functions are a mixture of
Gaussians. In [46] the authors have proved the eectiveness of the GMM for modeling score
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distributions and of the likelihood ratio fusion test in achieving high recognition rates when
densities estimations are based on GMM [46].
Let s = [s1; s2; :::sK ] denote the score vector of K dierent biometric matchers, where
sj is the random variable representing the match score provided by the j
th matcher, with
j = 1; 2; :::;K. Let fgen(textitbfs) and fimp(s) denote the conditional joint density of the
score vector s given respectively the genuine and impostor class. The estimates of fgen(s)
and fimp(s) are obtained as a mixture of Gaussians:
f^gen(s) =
MgenX
j=1
pgen;j
K(s;gen;j ;gen;j) (3.3)
f^imp(s) =
MimpX
j=1
pimp;j
K(s;imp;j ;imp;j) (3.4)
where K(s;; ) = (2) K=2jj 1=2exp( 12(s   )T 1(s   )) denotes the Gaussian
density with mean  and covariance matrix , and Mgen (Mimp) represents the number of
mixture components. Mixture parameters can be approximated by employing the tting
procedure of Figuereido and Jain [15], that uses EM algorithm and Minimum Message
Length (MML) criterion. It also estimates the optimal number of Gaussians and is able to
treat discrete values by modeling them as a mixture with a very small variance represented
as a regularization factor added to the diagonal of the covariance matrix.
Fusion based on GMM estimations achieves high performance [46], but there is an
important drawback. In practice, one has to determine reliable models for estimations of
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genuine and impostor match score densities from the available score to be used for training.
In absence of a large database, it is hard to obtain an accurate model, and this limitation
is particularly true for multibiometric systems, as the number of considered biometrics
increases.
3.2 The Proposed Approach
As said in the introduction, the quality of the acquired biometric data aects the eciency
of a matching process [47]. When the samples presented to a matcher are of poor quality,
it cannot reliably distinguish between genuine and impostor users. For example, some true
minutiae may not be detected in noisy ngerprint images, and missing minutiae may lead to
errors. Moreover, as stated in the previous Section, when several biometrics are available,
a not huge dataset could be not sucient for having a proper density estimate by means of
the GMM. So, we propose two approaches for improving the performance of the standard
LR test.
3.2.1 LR-based Majority Voting
An analysis of how the exclusion of some biometric modalities aects the GMM estimate:
this approach (hereinafter denoted as voting LR) can be associated to the attempt of implic-
itly individuating degraded quality samples, when the quality measures are not available.
In practice, given a K-dimensional score vector, we estimate the K conditional class joint
densities of K-1 scores, by using a GMM technique. Then, we xed for each of the K
estimates a threshold  on the training set that gives rise to a FAR equal to 0%. When we
have to judge a new sample, K, LR tests are made on the K densities and if at least one of
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the LR tests recognizes the sample as genuine it is declared as genuine by the system. The
ratio of this procedure lies in the fact that we want to detect if a particular score, say si,
coming from a genuine sample, could be aected by a low quality. In this case, it can be
expected that all the score vectors including si it will result in a low LR value, giving rise to
a false rejection. Only the K-1 dimensional score vector that do not include si could have
a LR value able to overcome the threshold. So, if at least one test is passed, the sample
with a single modality aected by low quality can be correctly recognized. The choice of
xing  on the training set so as to obtain a FAR equal to 0%, is motivated by the need of
having a system characterized by a FAR as low as possible. Since this approach uses only
K-1 dimensional score vectors, it should be also more robust to the lack of training data.
See Fig.3.2.
Figure 3.2: The input (biometric, claimed Id) is classied as genuine if at least one of the
k LR test outputs genuine.
3.2.2 LR-based Sequential Approach
A sequential likelihood ratio test (hereinafter denoted as Sequential LR) that introduces
the option of suspending the judgment if the hypothesis is accepted or rejected with a not
sucient degree of condence. This is a sort of sequential probability test (as stated in [76]
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by Wald) that use additional data for taking the nal decision, when it is not possible to
make a decision with a sucient reliability by only using the initial observation. In this
case LR(s) is rst compared with two dierent thresholds, say Ak and Bk:
in equation (4.2)
	(s) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1; when LR(s) > Ak
Suspension when Bk  LR(s)  Ak
0; when LR(s) < Bk
(3.5)
The thresholds Ak and Bk should be chosen so as to draw an uncertainty region around
the value of the threshold  given by the standard LR test. In practice, a fraction  of this
threshold can be chosen, so as Bk = (1   )   and Ak = (1 + )  . If LR(s) > Ak, to
turn the decision to advantage the genuine class, while if LR(s) < Bk, to turn the decision
to advantage the impostor class. In the case of suspension, i.e., when Bk  LR(s)  Ak,
the test procedure does not make any decision but activates a further step. The suspension
of the judgment is motivated by the fact that samples that are quite near to the threshold
could be misclassied due to the presence of one biometric trait acquired with a low quality.
So, as a second step we propose to adopt the same approach presented in the previous case.
In other words, K tests are made on score vectors of K-1 dimensions and the hypothesis is
refused only if it is refused by all the K voting components. See Fig.3.3.
3.2.3 Experiments
A brief description of the two modalities used in our experiments id given below.
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Figure 3.3: The samples classied with low condence by the LR Standard-based rule are
classied a second time by an additional LR voting-based stage.
Fingerprint Verication
A ngerprint is a pattern of ridges and valleys located on the tip of a nger. Digital images
of these patterns are provided by compact sensors (see Fig.3.4). Typically, the features
extracted from a ngerprint image are the so called minutiae points, which correspond to
the position and orientation of ridges endings and bifurcations (see Fig.3.5). The match
score is obtained after comparing the set of minutiae extracted from the user's print with
those composing the template [61].
Figure 3.4: The optical scanner Fx2000 Biometrika.
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Figure 3.5: Minutiae points extracted from a ngerprint image. They correspond to the
position and orientation of ridge endings or bifurcations [61].
Face Verication
Given a face image, the problem is to verify one or more persons in the scene. This involves a
matching between the feature set extracted from a face image and the template stored in the
database. A face detection process usually locates the face before the feature extraction. In a
controlled environment, enrolled and query images are taken in an uniform background with
identical poses and lighting conditions. In uncontrolled environments, factors as dierent
poses, scales, orientations and illuminance conditions, make this process dicult. Moreover,
occlusions, facial expressions or emotions, presence of components (e.g., glasses), represent
the most challenging problems in face recognition (see Fig.3.6).
Figure 3.6: Two face images taken from the Banca database. On the left the acquisition
of the subject has been performed under controlled conditions, while on the right under
uncontrolled conditions.
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Datasets
The performances of our approaches are evaluated on two databases. The rst one is a public
domain database, namely, NIST-BSSR1 (Biometric Scores Set - Release 1). The BSSR1
is a true multimodal database i.e., the face and the ngerprint images coming from the
same person at the same time. We performed experiments by employing the rst partition
made up of face and ngerprint scores belonging to a set of 517 people. For each individual,
it is available a score coming from the comparison of two right index ngerprint, a score
obtained by comparing impressions of two left index ngerprint, and two scores (from two
dierent matchers, say C and G) that are the outputs of the matching between two frontal
faces. So, in this case the match score for each modality indicates a distance. Then, our
rst dataset consists in an unbalanced population composed by 517 genuine and 266,772
(517*516) impostor users.
The second database is a subset of the BioSecure multimodal database. This database
contains 51 subjects in the Development Set (training) and 156 dierent subjects in the
Evaluation Set (testing). For each subject, four biometric samples are available over two
sessions: session 1 and session 2. The rst sample of the rst session was used to compose
the gallery database while the second sample of the rst session and the two samples of the
second session were used as probes (P1, P2, P3). For the purpose of this study, we used
the face and three ngerprint modalities, denoted as fnf, fo1, fo2 and fo3 [54]. The details
about the number of match scores per person are reported in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
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Table 3.1: The Biosecure DS2 database: Development Set
Biometric Subjects Samples Scores
Face 51 4 per subject Gen 204 3
Imp 51 50 16
Fingerprint 51 4 per subject Gen (204 3) 3
Imp (51 50 16) 3
Table 3.2: The Biosecure DS2 database: Evaluation Set
Biometric Subjects Samples Scores
Face 156 4 per subject Gen 624 3
Imp 156 155 16
Fingerprint 156 4 per subject Gen (624 3) 3
Imp (156 155 16) 3
Evaluation Procedure
We have performed a rst experiment in which the training set is composed by half of the
genuine and half of the impostor randomly selected from the dataset. The rest of the data
are used as test set. The second experiment was directed to analyze how the reduction of the
available scores for training aects the accuracy of the densities model. So, we performed
another test in which the training set is halved with respect to the previous case, while the
size of the test set remains unchanged. Both of these training-test partitioning have been
randomly repeated 10 times and we report the average performance over the 10 runs.
The current test procedure gives a specic rule for making one of the following decisions:
(1)accept the hypothesis to being tested, (2) to reject it, (3) to continue the experiment
by making an additional observation by performing an appropriate voting combination on
the score On the basis of the pure likelihood ratio test, one of the three decisions above is
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made. If the third decision is made, we accept the hypothesis if is accepted by at least one
of the voting
Experimental Results
Figure 3.7: Fitting a gaussian mixture: the solid ellipses are level-curves of each component
estimate (Biosecure database).
Tables 1 and 2 report the result of the two proposed approaches compared with the
standard LR test. Moreover, we also report the K-1 dimensional score vector that allowed
us to obtain the best results when used alone (in particular this score vector was composed
by the outputs of the two ngerprint matchers and of the Face G matcher). Three values
of  have been considered, namely 0:2, 0:25 and 0:30.
Our system was designed for reducing to zero the number of accepted impostors. So, in
order to have a fair comparison, the chosen operating point for each run of the standard LR
test was obtained by xing the FAR equal to 0% on the test set. The obtained threshold 
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Table 3.3: Test set results with a training set of equal size (on Nist database)
LR LR on (LfInd, Voting Serial LR Serial LR Serial LR
RxInd,FaceG) LR  = 0:2  = 0:25  = 0:30
FAR 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.000003%
GAR 95.60% 93.26% 97.77% 98.22% 98.22% 98.30%
Table 3.4: Test set results with a training set of halved size (on Nist database)
LR LR on (LfInd, Voting Serial LR Serial LR Serial LR
RxInd,FaceG) LR  = 0:2  = 0:25  = 0:30
FAR 0.0% 0.0003% 0.0% 0.000009% 0.000011% 0.000011%
GAR 81.24% 95.35% 98.30% 88.09% 88.09% 88.01%
is also used in the rst step of the sequential LR approach.
From the previous tables it is evident that the sequential LR always improves the GAR
obtainable with a standard LR, since its second stage is able to reduce misclassication of
genuine samples with respect to the pure likelihood ratio, for those samples classied with
a low degree of condence.
Another interesting results is that the voting LR approach seems to be more robust with
respect to the lack of training data. When only 25% of the data are used for training, in fact,
it is able to signicantly improve the GAR with respect to the standard LR approach. In
Table 3.5: Average number of suspended patterns on Nist database
Training set Serial LR Serial LR Serial LR
 = 0:2  = 0:25  = 0:30
50% 2.8 3.6 4.2
25% 2.2 2.2 2.4
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this case, sequential LR is instead only able to slightly improve the LR performance in terms
of GAR, but it also introduces few false accepted samples. On the contrary, when sucient
data for densities estimation are available, sequential LR achieves the best performance.
All summarizing, it is worth noting that in both experiments the proposed approaches
outperformed the standard LR test when a system at FAR=0% have to be realized.
Finally, is is interesting to consider the score distributions reported in Figures 1 and 2,
where the joint distributions of Left Index, Face C and Face G and of Face C and Face G
only are respectively shown. As it is evident (see also the considerations made by [72] on this
problem), the use of only two modalities signicantly reduces the possibility of distinguish
between genuine users and impostors. This is why we did not propose to further iterate the
sequential test by considering, for example, also the joint densities of all the possible score
pairs.
As the Table 1 shows, at xed FAR=0%, on the partitioning is 50%-50%, the GAR of
the pure likelihood ratio is 95.6%, while the GAR of the Sequential test is 98.2%. Moreover,
we observe that the implicit use of the quality measures in the fusion scheme improves the
accuracy, also when is not available a large data for training, this results in saving of about
50% in the number of observations. In fact, by using the 50% of the data for the training,
the GAR of the voting strategy alone is 97.8%, by using the 25% of the data for the training
its GAR is 95.6%, then the system is robust to the lack of scores. Finally, the likelihood
ratio where the density function is estimated by excluding the Face C modality, the GAR
is 96.6% on the partitioning 50%-50%, 95.4% on the partitioning 25%-50%.
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Table 3.6: Test set results with a training set of equal size on Biosecure dataset. (fnf1:
face modality; fo2, fo3: ngerprint modalities).
LR LR on (fnf1, Voting Serial LR Serial LR Serial LR
fo2,fo3) LR  = 0:2  = 0:25  = 0:30
FAR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
GAR 88.29% 95.71% 97.33% 88.48% 88.55% 88.57%
Table 3.7: Test set results with a training set of halved size on Biosecure dataset. (fnf1:
face modality; fo2, fo3: ngerprint modalities).
LR LR on (fnf1, Voting Serial LR Serial LR Serial LR
fo2, fo3) LR  = 0:2  = 0:25  = 0:30
FAR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
GAR 88.01% 96.58% 98.29% 88.14% 88.14% 88.29%
Table 3.8: Average number of suspended patterns (Biosecure database)
Training set Serial LR
50% 1.5
25% 1.5
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Figure 3.8: Score distribution of Left Index, Face C and Face G from NIST-BSSR1
Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed two Likelihood Ratio (LR)-based approaches for combin-
ingK biometric modality matchers, in order to minimize the number of false accepted users.
We demonstrated that, when the density functions of the standard LR can not be accurately
estimated, a voting strategy, involving K density estimations of K-1 modalities, is able to
eectively improve the performance of the multimodal system. We demonstrated also that,
when the density functions of the standard LR can be accurately estimated, an additional
stage, based on the previous voting strategy, can reduce the number of misclassied samples
belonging to an uncertainty region, resulting in very good GAR.
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Figure 3.9: Score distribution of Face C and Face G from NIST-BSSR1
Figure 3.10: Score distribution of fnf1 (face), fo1 and fo3 (ngerprints) from Biosecure
database. The red points represent impostor scores while the blue points represent the
genuine scores.
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Figure 3.11: Score distribution of fnf1 (face), fo1 (ngerprint) from Biosecure database.
Scientists are no better than anyone
else at forecasting the future. In fact,
their predictions are usually wildly
inaccurate.
Robert Wiston
Chapter 4
Multibiometric Identication
Scenario
The goal of a biometric identication system is to determine the identity of the input
biometric data. In such a system, the input probe (e.g., a face image) is compared against
a labeled gallery data (e.g., face images in a watch-list) resulting in a set of ranked scores
pertaining to the dierent identities in the gallery database. The identity corresponding to
the best score is then typically associated with that of the probe, see Fig.4.1.
In adverse environmental conditions (i.e. illumination changes in a face image) the
performance of the unimodal systems may be not ecient [34]. Moreover, in large-scale
identication systems, the feature space of the identities in the gallery may signicantly
overlap resulting in the degradation of identication accuracy. Further, in real scenarios
the input data is often noisy, and the similarity between the probe and the associated gallery
data is substantially reduced thereby impacting overall recognition accuracy.
This chapter concerns itself with the possibility of automatically determining if the
decision rendered by a biometric identication system is correct or not. Our aim is to
52
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Figure 4.1: The vector of features extracted from the probe image is compared against all
the templates stored in the database. A set of scores is generated and sorted. The one rank
value is assigned to the high similarity match score and the corresponding identity is chosen
as output of the system. The face images have been taken from the BANCA database.
predict identication errors and improve the recognition accuracy of the biometric system.
Our method utilizes the rank and score information generated by the identication operation
in order to validate the output. Further, we demonstrate that the proposed predictor can
be eectively applied in multimodal scenarios. Experiments performed on two multimodal
databases show the eectiveness of our framework in improving identication performance
of biometric systems. Finally, we investigate the question of whether it is possible to improve
the performance of the identication system by using the non-matched scores, referred to
as neighbors of the rank one identity. Our case study concerns the combination of face and
ngerprint recognition systems at hybrid rank-score level, as shown in Fig.4.2.
4.1 Predicting Identication Errors
This section focuses on reducing identication errors of multibiometric systems by involving
in the fusion scheme only outputs which are not degraded [30]. In real applications it is
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Figure 4.2: Combination of face and ngerprint modalities.
necessary that the unimodal system produces an estimate of decision reliability. This infor-
mation corresponds to the conditional probability that the decision made by the unimodal
system, given the available evidence E, is correct [33]. Estimating the level of trust in the
correctness of the decision can oer a feedback which may aid to appropriately weight uni-
modal results in a fusion scheme. An instance of error, corresponding to a False Rejection,
occurs when a legitimate user is not able to achieve a good enough similarity score to match
its entry in the gallery. A more dangerous error, corresponding to a False Acceptance, occurs
when an impostor has achieved a match within the gallery [68].
In the recent literature, quality and non-quality based approaches for biometric sys-
tem failure prediction have been proposed. Based on the correlation between quality and
recognition performance, quality was considered a good indicator in many studies in which
quality was promoted as a predictor of failure. Traditional biometric evaluation relied on a
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notion of quality associated to the raw image quality to determine the performance of the
system [67]. A failure condition corresponds to the presence of a low quality image input.
This notion of failure prediction is limiting since in presence of a low quality image the
system has to acquire another image sample. Such a scheme cannot be applied without a
real-time indication about the quality of the data, as it usually happens with multimodal
biometrics. Moreover, this notion of quality assessment was confuted in [68] by showing
cases in which, given a subject, poor quality images produce better matching scores than
high quality images.
An interesting alternative to quality analysis was presented by Scheirer and Boult in
[67], in which they proposed the idea of post-recognition failure predictor. Such a failure
predictor is able to learn when a system fails and when it succeeds, and to predict which
input is more likely to fail. Based on the decisions made from a classication system, they
dened two types of error, i.e. a Failure Prediction False Accept Rate (FPFAR) and a a
Failure Prediction False Reject Rate (FPFRR) and the Failure Prediction Receiver Operator
Characteristic (FPROC). This prediction analysis has been shown to be eective for single
modalities and able to enhance the overall performance when exploited in fusion schemes
[68].
They introduced failure prediction features derived from similarity scores and designed
to capture distributional information that is not represented from just a raw score. They
extracted the dierences between scores and the DCT coecients after transforming the top
n scores. The failure prediction analysis of their system predicts individual modality failures
and drives the fusion weighting them. In the work, the authors have presented a multi-modal
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recognition system integrating fusion-based failure prediction. The proposed multi-stage
architecture presents the fusion module at the highest level to integrate the results of failure
prediction across modalities. Four dierent fusion techniques were proposed to improve
failure prediction, three of them are able to improve failure prediction, and subsequently, the
recognition system performance. The described approach consists of a fusion via prediction.
According to the proposed multi-modal failure prediction, if one modality has failed, it is
possible to fuse information from another one that has succeeded; this lets to achieve good
recognition performance. They rstly evaluated the performance of four fusion techniques
for failure prediction, then they evaluated the failure prediction fusion-based recognition
system. The usage of DCT transform made quite complex the feature extraction, and
subsequently, the time needed for training the system expensive. Our approach simplies
this aspect by exploiting rank and score information for predicting errors and, subsequently,
improving the performance of the biometric system. In the proposed methodology, the
probability that the output decision is reliable is estimated by a pattern classier referred
to as a predictor. Its role is to detect potentially erroneous decisions. Further, we propose
three fusion mechanisms based on the trained predictor that can extend the benets of
the proposed scheme into a multimodal scenario. In particular, a predictor-based voting
strategy, a predictor-based serial fusion scheme and a predictor-based Borda Count method
are presented and compared against other common approaches to rank-level fusion.
The idea of marginalizing potentially incorrect decisions in a pattern recognition system
was used by Chow [8] to dene an optimum rejection rule. In the pattern recognition and
machine learning literature, several techniques have been proposed to predict the reliability
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of a classication decision rendered by a pattern recognition system (e.g., [10]). However,
such methods have been sparingly used in the biometric literature until recently. Kryszczuk
et al. [34] presented a method in which classier decisions and the corresponding reliability
information are combined to predict and correct verication decisions. Kryszczuk et al. [33]
later proposed a framework for probabilistic error rectication based on credence estimation
which was used to eliminate unreliable verication decisions.
4.1.1 Analysis Ratio-based
As stated earlier, a generic identication system compares the input biometric data to all
the known identities stored in the database and outputs a set of similarity scores. The
scores are then sorted in decreasing order to form a ranking list in which the lowest rank is
assigned to the highest similarity [1]. Let G = [G1; G2; :::GN ] be the gallery set, composed
by N biometric samples belonging to N dierent subjects. Let P = [P1; P2; :::PM ] be the
probe set, composed by M unknown samples belonging to subjects that are presumed to be
in the gallery. Given a single probe image, N comparisons of that probe against the gallery
are performed and N similarity scores are generated [5].
The present study is based on computing the ratio of scores corresponding to rank 1
and the other ranks. The vector of these ratios is treated like a feature vector and used
for training a pattern classier. Such a classier is used to learn the relationship between
the ratios and the posterior probabilities of the correct and error classes. Here, the term
\correct class" is used to indicate that the rank-1 identity is indeed the correct identity
of the probe; the term \error class" is used to indicate that the rank-1 identity does not
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correspond to the correct identity of the probe. Thus, the classier (predictor) is used to
learn the decision boundary between the correct identication region and the erroneous one
[39].
For a given input probe, let j denote the ratio of the rank-1 score to that of the rank-j
score. Thus, the vector (2; 3; : : : d+1)
t, d 2 f1 : : : N  1g, is used as input to the classier.
Typically, the rank-1 similarity score is expected to be signicantly higher than the other
scores (for a genuine match at rank-1). However, there are situations when the rank-1 score
may be comparable to that of other scores associated with the nearby ranks thus suggesting
the possibility of an error. In this work, we conrm this notion and, further, exploit it to
improve recognition accuracy.
Algorithm for training the unimodal predictor using ratios
Let G = [G1; G2; :::GN ] be the gallery set.
Let P = [P1; P2; :::PM ] be the probe set.
1. For each probe, generate N similarity match scores si, i = 1 : : : N by comparing that
probe against the gallery.
2. Sort the match scores in decreasing order.
3. Based on the previous sorted match scores, assign a rank Ri to each enrolled identity.
4. Compute the ratio j between the score corresponding to rank-1 and the score corre-
sponding to rank-j.
5. Label the ratio score vector as correct if rank 1 is assigned to the correct identity by
the unimodal matcher; otherwise label it as an error.
6. Use the labeled ratio score vectors as feature vectors to train a supervised classier.
Fig. 4.3 shows the architecture of the proposed approach.
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Figure 4.3: Error Prediction in a unimodal identication system. Here, ski and r
k
i denote the
score and rank, respectively, assigned to the ith identity in the gallery by the kth matcher;
Pk denotes the classier used to predict if the rank-1 identication is correct (C) or not (E)
based on the vector of score ratios (ratiok). The output of the matcher, Idk, is accepted or
rejected based on the predictor.
4.1.2 Dierences-based Analysis
The present study is based on computing the dierence of scores corresponding to rank 1
and the other ranks. The vector of these dierences is treated like a feature vector and used
for training a pattern classier. Such a classier is used to learn the relationship between
the ratios and the posterior probabilities of the correct and error classes. Here, the term
\correct class" is used to indicate that the rank-1 identity is indeed the correct identity
of the probe; the term \error class" is used to indicate that the rank-1 identity does not
correspond to the correct identity of the probe. Thus, the classier ( predictor) is used
to learn the decision boundary between the correct identication region and the erroneous
one.
For a given input probe, let ij denote the dierence of the rank-i score to that of the
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rank-j score. Thus, the vector (2; 3; : : : d+1)
t, d 2 f1 : : : N   1g, is used as input to the
classier. The distribution of the dierences between scores in terms of ranks gives the
information about the direction of the largest variance for each modality. Typically, the
rank-1 similarity score is expected to be signicantly higher than the other scores (for a
genuine match at rank-1). However, there are situations when the rank-1 score may be
comparable to that of other scores associated with the nearby ranks thus suggesting the
possibility of an error. In this work, we conrm this notion and, further, exploit it to
improve recognition accuracy. The dierence which presents the highest variability can be
projected in the space of two modalities to analyze the separation between the classes error
and correct.
Algorithm for training the unimodal predictor using dierences
Let G = [G1; G2; :::GN ] be the gallery set.
Let P = [P1; P2; :::PM ] be the probe set.
1. For each probe, generate N similarity match scores si, i = 1 : : : N by comparing that
probe against the gallery.
2. Sort the match scores in decreasing order.
3. Based on the previous sorted match scores, assign a rank Ri to each enrolled identity.
4. Compute the dierences ij between the score corresponding to rank-i and the score
corresponding to rank-j.
5. Label the dierence score vector as correct if rank 1 is assigned to the correct identity
by the unimodal matcher; otherwise label it as an error.
6. Use the labeled dierence score vectors as feature vectors to train a supervised clas-
sier.
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4.2 A Predictor-based Framework
In a multibiometric identication system, the output of K dierent biometric modality
matchers C1; C2; :::CK have to be consolidated. The information observed at the score level
can be represented as a N K matrix S = [skn], where skn represents the match score output
when the probe image is compared against the nth gallery image, using the kth classier,
k = 1; :::;K; n = 1; :::; N . This score matrix can be converted to a rank matrix R = [rkn]
where rkn represents the rank of the n
th gallery image with respect to the probe as assessed
by the kth modality matcher.
4.2.1 Predictor-based Majority Voting
In the majority voting scheme, the outputs of the K classiers are examined and the most
commonly occurring output is selected as the nal output. Thus, for a given probe, K
unimodal matchers are employed and the winner is the identity to which the majority of
matchers have assigned a rank value equal to one. The majority vote will result in an
ensemble decision [35]:
arg max
i=1:::N
KX
k=1
dik  vk (4.1)
where the binary variable dik is 1 if the k
th matcher outputs identity i in rank-1, and the
binary variable vk is 1 if the identication is deemed to be correct by the k
th predictor. Fig.
4.4 presents this scheme. The majority vote scheme will assign an identity to the probe only
if the output of at least b12Kk=1vkc + 1 unimodal systems correspond to the same identity
and are deemed to be correct by vk. For example, suppose there are 5 unimodal systems.
Assume that for the identity corresponding to the true user (say, `Bob'), 3 out of 5 systems
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output the identity `Alice', while the other two output `Bob'. Suppose that 2 out of the
3 predictors state that the output `Alice' is in error, while the others indicate that their
respective outputs were correct, then the nal output of the predictor-based multimodal
system will be `Bob'. If a majority is not possible, then the proposed mechanism attempts
to use the rank-1 accuracy of individual classiers to make the decision. According to this
design, when the unimodal outputs are K dierent identities, the output from the overall
system will correspond to the identity output from the unimodal system with the highest
accuracy (as assessed using training data before deployment of individual matchers). Those
contributions considered as errors by the predictor module are excluded from the nal
decision.
Figure 4.4: Predictor-based Majority Voting.
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4.2.2 Predictor-based Serial Scheme
In the serial scheme, the decisional process is split into two successive stages [43]. The
subject to be authenticated submits the rst biometric modality to the system which is
processed and matched against all the templates present in the gallery. If the resulting
identity is labeled to be correct by the predictor module, the input biometric trait is associ-
ated to the current identity, otherwise the system suspends the decision and an additional
processing stage is performed. In the second stage, K-1 additional biometric modalities are
automatically requested and a voting strategy involving K-1 unimodal matchers is adopted
in the second stage. The described predictor-based serial combination framework is shown
in the Fig. 4.5. It can be formulated as follows:
Idm =
8>><>>:
Idu; if vu = 1
argmaxi=1:::N
PK 1
k=1 dik  vk if vu = 0
(4.2)
where Idm is the output of the multimodal system and Idu is the output of the unimodal
system at the rst stage.
4.2.3 Predictor-based Borda Count
In the Borda Count model, the rank for each identity in the database is calculated as the
weighted sum of the individual ranks assigned by the K modality matchers:
Ri =
KX
k=1
wk rik; i = 1; 2; :::N (4.3)
This method assigns a higher weight to the ranks provided by the more accurate matcher.
Therefore, it is useful when dierent biometric matchers exhibit signicant dierences in
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Figure 4.5: Predictor-based Serial Fusion: the rst stage is based on the unimodal system
and the error predictor for this modality while the second stage consists of a predictor-based
majority voting scheme which uses K-1 modalities.
their accuracies. A training phase has to be performed to determine the weights. In the
proposed predictor-based fusion scheme, the unimodal outputs labeled as errors by the
predictor have to be excluded from the sum in the equation above which determines the
fused rank for each identity. This can be achieved by computing the weight wk as the
ratio between the number of correct identications detected by the predictor and the total
number of test probes. follows:
wk =
vikPK
k=1 vik
i = 1; 2; :::N (4.4)
The weight factor based on the predictor reduces the eect of inaccurate decisions provided
by potentially incorrect matchers. As an example, consider the fusion of 5 modality match-
ers. Assume that for the identity corresponding to the true identity (say, i = 1), 4 out of the
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Table 4.1: WVU Multimodal Biometric Database
Biometric Subjects Samples Scores
Face 240 5 per subject Gen 1200 4
Imp 240 239 25
Fingerprint 240 5 per nger Gen (1200 4) 4
Imp (240 239 25) 4
5 matchers result in rank 1, while the 5th results in rank 5. If the outputs of the predictors
are 1 for the rst 4 modalities and 0 for the last one, the nal rank will be 4.
4.2.4 Performance Evaluation
Datasets
In the present thesis, we have considered a multimodal identication system that integrates
ngerprint and face experts. The performance of the proposed strategy was evaluated on
two databases. The rst is the West Virginia University (WVU) multimodal biometric
database. A subset of this database pertaining to the ngerprint (left thumb [FL1], right
thumb [FR1], left index [FL2], right index [FR2]) and face modalities of 240 subjects was
used in our experiments. Five samples per subject for each modality were available. Table
4.1 provides the details of the database. For the face modality, frontal images were collected
in a controlled scenario. For the ngerprint modality, images were collected using an optical
biometric scanner, without explicitly controlling the quality [11]. The entire dataset was
divided into ve sets: the rst sample of each identity was used to compose the gallery
and the remaining four samples of each identity were used as probes (P1, P2, P3, P4). The
VeriFinger software was used for generating the ngerprint scores and the VeriLook software
was used for generating the face scores.
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Table 4.2: The Biosecure database: Development Set
Biometric Subjects Samples Scores
Face 51 4 per subject Gen 204 3
Imp 51 50 16
Fingerprint 51 4 per subject Gen (204 3) 3
Imp (51 50 16) 3
Table 4.3: The Biosecure database: Evaluation Set
Biometric Subjects Samples Scores
Face 156 4 per subject Gen 624 3
Imp 156 155 16
Fingerprint 156 4 per subject Gen (624 3) 3
Imp (156 155 16) 3
The second database is a subset of the BioSecure multimodal database. This database
contains 51 subjects in the Development Set (training) and 156 dierent subjects in the
Evaluation Set (testing). For each subject, four biometric samples are available over two
sessions: session 1 and session 2. The rst sample of each subject in the rst session was
used to compose the gallery database while the second sample of the rst session and the
two samples of the second session were used as probes (P1, P2, P3). For the purpose of this
study, we used the face and three ngerprint modalities, denoted as fnf, fo1, fo2 and fo3,
respectively [54]. The details about the number of match scores per person are reported in
Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
Evaluation Procedure
First, we performed a preliminary analysis to understand the distribution of the ratios
between scores as a function of the ranks (i.e., the k's) for the correct and error classes.
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This was used to determine the dimension of the vector of ratios (i.e., d) that is suitable for
error prediction. The number d was empirically derived for each modality in the individual
databases considered in this work. Next, the proposed algorithm was evaluated on the two
databases. Since the number of identication errors made by some of the biometric matchers
is low, the negative class cannot be eciently represented. This aects the training of the
predictor. In order to maximize the amount of available data, the training and testing was
performed by adopting the leave-one-out strategy. The classier was trained by using the
samples provided by all but one of the identities in the gallery and its performance was
tested on the excluded identity [6].
Results
As Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7 show, in the space of ratios, the distributions of the misclassied
identities are reasonably separated from those that were correctly recognized.
Fig. 4.11 and Fig. 4.10 show that, for both modalities face and ngerprint, the dierence
between the rank-1 score and rank-2 score, here referred to r1r2, presents the highest
variance.
We have also plotted the dierence r1r2 in the space of face and ngerprint modalities,
as shown in Fig. 4.12, and the correct identications are well separated from the errors, as
assessed by the modality matchers.
The classication was accomplished using three dierent classiers: a Support Vector
Machine (SVM), a Decision Tree and a Bayesian classier. Since the SVM classier gave
the best results on both databases, only its performance is being reported in this chapter.
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Figure 4.6: The distribution of the ratios between scores in terms of ranks of all the users
in the WVU database for the face modality, where the gallery set is composed by the rst
sample of each subject and the probe set by the fth sample. Red points represent rank-1
misclassications.
Figure 4.7: The distribution of the ratios between scores in terms of ranks of all the users
of the Development Set in the Biosecure database for the face modality, where the gallery
set is composed by the rst sample of each subject and the probe set by the second sample.
Red points represent rank-1 misclassications.
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Figure 4.8: Performance of the prediction scheme using a Support Vector Machine trained
on the WVU data.
Figure 4.9: Performance of the prediction scheme using a Support Vector Machine trained
on the Biosecure data.
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Figure 4.10: The distribution of the dierences between scores in terms of ranks of all the
users in the WVU database for the face modality, where the gallery set is composed by the
rst sample of each subject and the probe set by the fth sample. Red points represent
rank-1 misclassications.
Further, the classication performance was observed as a function of d, i.e., the number
of ratios used to construct the feature vector. The face modality in the WVU database
required d = 5; the FL1, FR1 and FR2 modalities required d = 7 and the ngerprint FL2
modality required d = 10 (see Figure 4.8). For the Biosecure dataset, all the 3 ngerprint
modalities required d = 3 while the face required d = 5 (see Figure 4.9).
Tables 4.4, 4.5, 4.7 and 4.8 compare the results of the proposed scheme against other
schemes. We compared the performance of our methods against the Highest Rank and Borda
Count approaches [63] as well as the pure Majority Voting Scheme in which the predictor for
each modality was not used (ties were broken randomly). From these tables it is evident that
the predictor-based majority voting which uses the predictor for each modality, outperformed
Chapter 4. Multibiometric Identication Scenario 71
Figure 4.11: The distribution of the dierences between scores in terms of ranks of all the
users in the WVU database for the ngerprint modality, where the gallery set is composed
by the rst sample of each subject and the probe set by the third sample. Red points
represent rank-1 misclassications.
Figure 4.12: The distribution of the dierences between scores in terms of ranks of all
the users in the WVU database for the face and ngerprint modalities, where blue points
represent a correct identication as assessed by both modalities, while green and red points
represent cases in which the unimodal labels about a potential error are contrasting.
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Table 4.4: Performance of the traditional fusion schemes on the four probe sets in the WVU
database.
Probe Highest Borda Pure Majority
Rank Count Voting
P1 91.67% 97.22% 100.00%
P2 88.33% 95.56% 99.44%
P3 90.56% 96.11% 97.78%
P4 93.33% 96.67% 99.44%
Avg 90.97% 96.39% 99.17%
Table 4.5: Performance of the predictor-based fusion schemes on the four probe sets in the
WVU database, where the predictor was training using ratio score vectors
Probe Predictor-based Predictor-based Predictor-based
Majority Voting Serial Borda Count
P1 100.00% 100.00% 97.22%
P2 100.00% 99.44% 96.11%
P3 100.00% 99.44% 96.11%
P4 100.00% 98.89% 97.22%
Avg 100.00% 99.44% 96.67%
the other traditional approaches. Moreover, the serial scheme also improved the correct
identication rate since, in the second stage, it is able to handle those cases that are classied
as errors in the rst stage. We also observed that the improvement in performance was
especially signicant in the case of the BioSecure Database where traditional rank-level
fusion schemes did not perform very well.
Table 4.6 reports results of two predictor-based fusion scheme, where the predictor has
been trained by using the dierence score vectors. From these tables it is evident that the
predictor-based majority voting which uses the predictor for each modality, outperformed
the other traditional approaches. Moreover, the serial scheme also improved the correct
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Table 4.6: Performance of the predictor-based fusion schemes on the four probe sets in the
WVU database, where the predictor was training by using dierence score vector
Probe Predictor-based Predictor-based
Majority Voting Serial
P1 100.00% 100.00%
P2 100.00% 99.58%
P3 100.00% 100.00%
P4 100.00% 99.58%
Avg 100.00% 99.79%
Table 4.7: Performance of the traditional fusion schemes on the three probe sets in the
Biosecure database
Probe Highest Borda Pure Majority
Rank Count Voting
P1 87.18% 96.15% 89.74%
P2 78.85% 88.46% 83.97%
P3 74.36% 92.31% 84.62%
Avg 80.13% 92.31% 86.11%
identication rate since, in the second stage, it is able to handle those cases that are classied
as errors in the rst stage.
4.2.5 Cross-Validation Evaluation
The training and testing of the error prediction scheme was also performed by adopting
the cross validation strategy to maximize the amount of available data during the training
phase. The classier was trained over 5 iterations by using the samples provided by the 25%
of the identities in the gallery and its performance was tested on the excluded identities [6].
The classication was accomplished using three dierent classiers: a Support Vector
Machine (SVM), a Decision Tree and a Bayesian classier. Since the Decision Tree classier
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Table 4.8: Performance of the predictor-based fusion schemes on the three probe sets in the
Biosecure database, where the predictor was training using ratio score vectors
Probe Predictor-based Predictor-based Predictor-based
Majority Voting Borda Count Serial
P1 100.00% 96.15% 100.00%
P2 94.23% 89.10% 94.87%
P3 97.44% 92.31% 94.87%
Avg 97.22% 92.52% 96.58%
Figure 4.13: Performance of the prediction scheme using a Decision Tree trained on the
WVU data, where the predictor was training using ratio score vectors.
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Figure 4.14: Performance of the prediction scheme using a Support Vector Machine trained
on the Biosecure data, where the predictor was training using ratio score vectors.
gave the best results on WVU database and the SVM classier gave the best results on
Biosecure database, only their performances are being reported in this chapter. Further,
the classication performance was also observed as a function of d, i.e., the number of ratios
used to compose the feature vector. In fact, an instance of error may occur at prediction
level too, since an error can be made by the predictor itself. The face modality in the
WVU database required d = 5; the FL1, FR1 and FR2 modalities required d = 7 and the
ngerprint FL2 modality required d = 10 (see Figure 4.13). For the Biosecure dataset, all
the 3 ngerprint modalities required d = 3 while the face required d = 5 (see Figure 4.14).
Tables 4.9, 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 compare the results of the proposed scheme against other
schemes. We compared the performance of our methods against the Highest Rank and
Borda Count approaches [63] as well as the pure Majority Voting Scheme in which the
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Table 4.9: Performance of traditional fusion schemes on the four probe sets in the WVU
database. The accuracy has been evaluated by 5-fold cross validation and the classication
rates have been averaged.
Probe Highest Borda Pure Majority
Rank Count Voting
P1 93.89% 92.89% 99.33%
P2 91.78% 91.67% 98.89%
P3 91.67% 90.78% 98.11%
P4 91.67% 90.78% 98.11%
Avg 92.25% 91.53% 98.61%
Table 4.10: Performance of the predictor-based fusion schemes on the four probe sets in
the WVU database. The accuracy has been evaluated by 5-fold cross validation and the
classication rates have been averaged.
Probe Highest Borda Pure Majority
Rank Count Voting
P1 99.66% 96.56% 92.89%
P2 98.77% 93.67% 91.45%
P3 99.44% 92.22% 90.11%
P4 99.33% 93.67% 91.89%
Avg 99.30% 94.03% 91.59%
Table 4.11: Performance of the traditional fusion schemes on the three probe sets in the
Biosecure database
Probe Highest Borda Pure Majority
Rank Count Voting
P1 87.18% 96.15% 89.74%
P2 78.85% 88.46% 83.97%
P3 74.36% 92.31% 84.62%
Avg 80.13% 92.31% 86.11%
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Table 4.12: Performance of the predictor-based fusion schemes on the three probe sets in
the Biosecure database
Probe Predictor-based Predictor-based Predictor-based
Majority Voting Borda Count Sequential
P1 90.38% 90.38% 95.51%
P2 87.18% 87.18% 89.10%
P3 91.67% 91.67% 92.31%
Avg 89,74% 89,74% 92,32%
predictor for each modality was not used (ties were broken randomly). From these tables
it is evident that the weighted majority voting which uses the predictor for each modality,
outperformed the other traditional approaches. The training has been aected by a lack of
examples belonging to the negative class.
4.3 Graph-based Framework for Personal Identication Fu-
sion at Rank-Score Level
In this section, we investigate the question of whether it is possible to improve the per-
formance of the identication system by using the non-matched scores. The idea is to
incorporate the similarities of the query with that of its neighbors in order to have more
information to be fused. Biometric identication techniques typically base the decision only
on the match score representing the similarity between the identity query and the template
of each gallery identity stored in the database. Traditional fusion methods derive the com-
bined score by taking only the match scores related to a particular subject (the identity
query). The proposed framework attempts to use additional information when computing
the integrated score for each person. In particular, the combination functions at rank level
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usually consider only the rank one output from each biometric matcher to compute the
integrated rank of person i-th. This kind of fusion is called local. Conversely, the distri-
bution of the i-th query identity in a global method is modeled by considering the subset
of the enrolled persons similar to the query. The proposed approach belongs to this last
category and it uses a subset of non-matching templates in the database, referred as cohorts
[73]. When dealing with a large number of classes, as in the case with biometric person
identication systems, they tend to overlap. For most biometrics to nd a good model for
representing a universal background class is an interesting challenge. The complement class
for the query identity is given by those models as impostors, which have good resemblance
with the model of the subject to which the system has assigned rank value one. In our
problem, good impostors are represented by the identities in top of the candidate list, in
fact they are expected to be more similar to the identity at rank one.
4.3.1 Cohort Analysis in Biometrics
The strategy of looking beyond the similarity of the query with only that of the claimed
identity was already proposed by Bolle et al. in [16] in the biometric verication scenario.
In their work, the matching scores of the other people are used into the decision making. In
identication mode, the cohort information is associated to the neighbors in the candidate
list of the genuine identity. This additional information can be exploited in a fusion scheme,
when computing the integrated rank for each person.
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4.3.2 Our approach
The proposed framework is based on the idea that the distances between the query and
its neighbors may help to reduce the error rate. A crucial step of the proposed strategy
consists in Cohort selection. For each enrolled template, we identify its cohorts based on a
ranking criterion. The proposed combination approach attempts to extend the traditional
methods by using the match scores corresponding to a subset of all people.
4.3.3 Graph Theory for Modeling
For most biometrics, to nd a good model representing a universal background class is
an interesting challenge. In order to improve the recognition accuracy, the match scores
and the information about their relative ranking are treated as two dierent pieces of the
evidence [49]. This means that, we consider the output of each unimodal system as a list of
candidates with the condence measure associated to each item. The top of such as list is
model through a graph. It is composed by two levels: a root node representing the genuine
identity and its neighbor nodes representing the impostors that are the most similar to the
identity having rank one [27], (see Fig.4.15).
Summary
In this chapter, we presented a methodology in which both ranks and scores have been used
to improve the identication accuracy of multimodal biometric systems. For each modality,
ranks and scores have been used to design a pattern classier (predictor) which is able to
estimate the decision reliability of the corresponding modality matcher in order to detect
identication errors. This information has been introduced in novel fusion schemes. The
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Figure 4.15: The two-levels graph represents the top 10 of the candidate list.
proposed predictor-based techniques performed better than the commonly used rank-level
fusion mechanisms. In particular, the predictor-based majority voting resulted in the best
accuracy by achieving an average recognition rate of 100% on the WVU dataset and 97.22%
on the Biosecure dataset. The improvement in performance is especially signicant in the
BioSecure database. Since the predictor is based on a training phase, it generalizes very
well across identities. Consequently, the predictor does not have to be retrained when
a new individual is added to the database. Experiments are underway to determine the
robustness of the scheme to variations in quality on the input data. It must be stated that
the simple sum of scores results in good identication performance on the database used
in our experiments; however, we can consider the methodology proposed in this chapter
as a promising approach for using both ranks and scores in a systematic way to predict
identication errors in biometric systems.
A genius is eternal patience.
Michelangelo
Chapter 5
Robustness to Spoof Attacks
A biological measurement can be qualied as a biometric and then used in a recognition
process, only if it satisfy basic requisite like universality, permanence, distinctiveness, cir-
cumvention. The last property concerns the possibility of a non-client being falsely accepted,
typically by spoong the biometric trait [25]. Previous works have shown that it is possible
to spoof a variety of ngerprint technologies through relatively simple techniques. They use
molds of ngers made with materials as Silicon, Play-Doh, Clay and Gelatin (gummy n-
ger). In 2002, Matsumoto et al. [70] conducted experimental spoong research by creating
gummy ngers to attack ngerprint verication systems. They have reported a vulnerabil-
ity evaluation of 68%-100% for cooperative users and 67% for not-cooperative users (when
data were extracted from latent ngerprints).
The main focus of this chapter concerns the security risk in multimodal biometric sys-
tems due to spoof attacks. We have analyzed the performance of the most ecient multi-
biometric systems in presence of spoong and our experiments show that the probability
of deceiving a multibiometric system is high even if only one modality is spoofed Then,
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we proposed a novel liveness detection algorithm for the ngerprint modality, which com-
bines static features based on the skin perspiration phenomenon and on the morphologic
properties of the ngerprint [69]. The experiments were carried out by adopting stan-
dard databases taken from the Liveness Detection Competition 2009 (LivDet09) in which
Biometrika, CrossMatch and Identix sensors were used [42]. Further, we presented a novel
study focused on how the performance of the liveness detection algorithms changes when
fake ngers are produced by employing materials that are dierent with respect to those
adopted for training. Finally, we tested this our algorithm in a fusion scheme.
5.1 Analysis of the Robustness of Multimodal Biometric Sys-
tems against Spoof Attacks
From a security perspective, a multimodal system appears more protected than its unimodal
components, since spoong two or more modalities is harder than spoong only one [63].
However, since a multimodal system involves dierent biometric traits, it oers a higher
number of vulnerable points that may be attacked and a hacker may fake only a subset
of them. There is indeed a trade-o between the number of fused biometric traits and
the oered security level. Recently, researchers investigated if a multimodal system can be
deceived by spoong only a subset of the fused modalities [57]. Rodrigues et al. proposed a
method which considers as measure of security also the information pertaining the ease to
spoof each biometric in order to weight the contribution provided by the single modality to
the multimodal system. The idea is that, if a high quality sample gives a low match score,
the probability of success for a spoof attack is high. This work has been extended in [26],
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by exploring the multimodal vulnerability and strategies for fusion in a scenario in which
partial spoong has occurred. In this section, we also looked at the cases where some but
not all modalities are spoofed. The experiments were conducted by employing the scores
sum rule on two multimodal databases composed by face and ngerprint.
5.1.1 Experimental Analysis
Datasets
The performance of the considered strategy was evaluated on two multimodal databases.
The rst is NIST-BSSR1 (Biometric Scores Set - Release 1). It is a true multimodal
database i.e., the face and the ngerprint images coming from the same person at the same
time. Our experiments were carried out by employing the rst partition made up of face and
ngerprint scores belonging to a set of 517 people. For each individual, it is available a score
coming from the comparison of two right index ngerprints, a score obtained by comparing
impressions of two left index ngerprints, and two scores (from two dierent matchers, say
C and G) that are the outputs of the matching between two frontal faces. The match score
for each modality indicates a distance. Our dataset consists in an unbalanced population
composed by 517 genuine and 266,772 (517*516) impostor match scores.
The second database is a subset of the BioSecure multimodal database. This database
contains 51 subjects in the Development Set (training) and 156 dierent subjects in the
Evaluation Set (testing). For each subject, four biometric samples are available over two
sessions: session 1 and session 2. The rst sample of each subject in the rst session was
used to compose the gallery database while the second sample of the rst session and the
two samples of the second session were used as probes (P1, P2, P3). For the purpose of
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this study, we have employed one face and three ngerprint modalities, denoted as fnf,
fo1, fo2 and fo3, respectively [54]. The scores used in our experiments are the output of
the matching between the rst available sample and the second one for each subject. Our
second dataset consists in an unbalanced population composed by 516 genuine and 24,180
(156*155) impostor match scores.
Experimental Procedure
According to the assumption that live-spoof match scores would be similarly distributed
as live-live match scores, the simulation of an unimodal spoof attack has been realized
by substituting a genuine match score in place of an impostor match score. Given the
availability of four modalities, we have rstly analyzed a multi-biometric system which
exploits four modalities without spoong simulation, then the cases where one, two, three
and all the modalities have been spoofed. Fusing the match scores from multiple sources,
such as from face and dierent instances of ngerprints, the resulting system should achieve
a higher recognition accuracy [26]. The current system has been designed by computing
the FRR and FAR/SFAR at dierent threshold levels and plotting them in a DET curve
on a log scale. As common practice, the operating point of the system corresponds to the
point where the FRR value is very close to the FAR (ERR Equal Error Rate) on the curve
representing the no spoong simulation scenario. This sets a common threshold level at
which the additional curves representing scenarios where spoof attacks have been simulated
can be compared to that one where spoof attacks are absent. Fig. 5.1 and 5.2 show three
groups of DET curves based on SFAR, for one modality spoofed, two modalities spoofed
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and three modalities spoofed.
Figure 5.1: DET plot for a multi-modal system which exploits four modalities taken from
Biosecure database. The dark black line indicates the performance of the traditional fusion
scheme based on the sum rule with trade-o between FAR and FRR.
Further, a two modality system has been designed by using face and ngerprint scores.
The related DET curves are shown in Fig. 5.3 and 5.4.
Discussion
The results of Figure 1, concerning the Biosecure data, show an ERR (FAR/FRR) of 0.64%.
For this operating point, when one of three ngerprint modalities is spoofed, referred to
as fo1, fo2 and fo3, the average SFAR is respectively of 6.29%, 8.92% and 8.45%, with
an associated FRR of 0.64%. When the face modality is spoofed, the SFAR jumps up to
an average of 77.67%, since that modality presents the highest recognition accuracy in an
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Figure 5.2: DET plot for a multi-modal system which exploits four modalities taken from
Nist database.
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Figure 5.3: DET plot for a multi-modal system which exploits two modalities taken from
Biosecure database. The dark black line indicates the performance of the traditional fusion
scheme based on the sum rule with trade-o between FAR and FRR.
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Figure 5.4: DET plot for a multi-modal system which exploits two modalities taken from
Nist database.
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unimodal scenario. When two of four modalities are spoofed, SFAR achieves 91.89%, while
when three of four modalities are spoofed, SFAR jumps up to 98.66%.
The results of Figure 2, concerning the Nist data, show an ERR (FAR/FRR) of 0.58%.
For this operating point, when one of four modalities is spoofed, the average SFAR is 4.04%,
with an associated FRR of 0.58%. When two modalities are spoofed, SFAR jumps up to
81.40% and to 97.10% when three modalities are spoofed.
The two modality system presented analogous performance, as shown in Figures 3 and 4.
On Biosecure database, with an FRR of 1.93%, when one modality is spoofed SFAR becomes
74.74% averaged over the two modalities. On Nist database, with an FRR of 1.54%, when
one modality is spoofed SFAR becomes 63.26% averaged over the two modalities.
5.1.2 Likelihood Ratio Test
The Likelihood Ratio (LR) between the genuine and impostor distribution is known to
be the optimal fusion method which minimizes the probability of error. We obtained a
representative estimation of both distributions using training data taken from Biosecure
and Nist databases using a Gaussian mixture model. The training process was carried out
employing only non-spoofed impostor scores, while the testing scenario involved the case in
which only a subset of the fused biometric modality was spoofed (see Fig.5.5 and Fig.5.6).
5.1.3 Identication Scenario
It was interesting to simulate a spoof attack to a biometric identication system, where in
case of an identication error, the score at rank1 was substituted with the score correspond-
ing to the true identity of the considered matching (see Fig.5.7).
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Figure 5.5: Performance of the Likelihood Ratio Test based on joint density distributions
of two ngerprint modalities and two face modalities taken from the Biosecure database.
5.1.4 Discussion
In this section, we analyzed the security of the existing multibiometric systems a subset
of the fused modalities is successfully spoofed. The experiments showed a signicant vul-
nerability of the existing fusion scheme in presence of attacks where not all modalities are
spoofed. Our idea is to detect spoof attack to the single component matcher before fusion.
This concerns the incorporation of a spoong detection algorithm in a fusion scheme in
order to achieve an increase of the multimodal performance in the described real scenario.
Thus, we explored the topic concerning the detection of vitality in ngerprint images.
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Figure 5.6: Performance of the Likelihood Ratio Test based on joint density distributions
of two ngerprint modalities and two face modalities taken from the Nist database.
5.2 Combining Morphology- and Perspiration-based Features
for Liveness Detection in Fingerprint Scanners
Fingerprint scanners are the most widely adopted for personal identication. However,
the security of a ngerprint-based identication system is compromised in presence of fake
biometric data. In fact, it is possible to deceive automatic ngerprint identication systems
by presenting a well-duplicated synthetic nger. Articial ngers created from ngerprints
of enrolled users used to attempt to gain unauthorized access are called spoofs[51]. This
kind of attack at sensor level can occur when people wish to disguise their own identity
or when a person wants to gain privileges of an authorized person. To minimize sensor
vulnerability, dierent approaches have been proposed. As an ecient mean to circumvent
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Figure 5.7: Performance of the score sum involving two ngerprint modalities and two face
modalities taken from the Biosecure database, in identication operation.
attacks that use spoof ngers, liveness detection has been suggested. In the context of
biometrics, liveness detection means the capability for the system to detect if the biometric
sample presented is really from a live nger tip or not. Liveness methods may belong to
two main categories, see Fig.5.8.
The rst one exploits characteristics as the temperature of the nger, the electrical con-
ductivity of the skin and the pulse oximetry. They can be detected by using additional
hardware in conjunction with the biometric sensor. This makes costly the device. The sec-
ond category performs an extra process of the biometric sample in order to detect the vitality
information directly from the ngerprint images. In this chapter, we focus on this second
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Figure 5.8: An example of live and fake(gummy) ngerprint image.
category of approaches, known as software-based [69]. The existing software-based solutions
may include dynamic or static methods [7]. Static characteristics (as temperature, conduc-
tivity) and dynamic behaviors (skin deformation, perspiration) of live nger tips have been
extensively studied in ngerprint liveness detection research. In particular, morphology-
and perspiration-based characteristics have been typically exploited separately. Since both
features provide discriminant information about live and fake ngers, it is reasonable to
investigate also their joint contribution.
5.2.1 Dynamic approaches
Dynamic features derive from the analysis of multiple frames of the same nger. A typical
dynamic property of a live nger is the perspiration phenomenon that starts from the pores
and evolves in time across the ridges, see Figure 5.9. This distinctive spatial moisture pat-
tern can be detected by observing multiple ngerprint images acquired in two appropriate
dierent times. An interesting method based on perspiration changes in live ngers was
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presented in [3]. In this method, the changing perspiration pattern is isolated through a
wavelet analysis of the entire ngerprint image. For an image processing algorithm, to quan-
tify the sweating pattern is challenging. Since this pattern is a physiological phenomenon,
it is variable across subjects. Further, it presents a certain sensitivity to the environment,
the pressure of the nger, the time interval and the initial moisture content of the skin [56].
Its eectiveness requires an ecient extraction of the evolving pattern from images.
Figure 5.9: The image shows a macro photography of a live ngerprint.
5.2.2 Static approaches
Static features can be extracted from a single ngerprint impression or as dierence be-
tween dierent impressions. Generally, static measurements may be altered by factors
as the pressure of the nger on the scanner surface. According to the taxonomy pro-
posed in [52], features extracted by dierent impressions can be skin deformation-based
or morphology-based, while features extracted by a single impression can be perspiration-
based or morphology-based. Morphology-based features give a general description of the
ngerprint pattern using its geometrical properties. Those based on the perspiration phe-
nomenon quantify perspiration patterns along ridges in live subjects. Elastic deformations
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due to the contact, the pressure and the rotation of the ngertip on the plane surface of
the sensor, are more evident in fake ngerprints made using articial materials than in live
ngerprints. Deformation-based methods detect liveness by comparing these distortions
through static features [78]. The elastic behavior of live and fake ngers has been analyzed
by extracting a specic set of minutiae points, see Figure 5.10. The second type of static
features using multiple impressions relies on a morphologic investigation which exploits the
thickness of the ridges that is modied after producing the ngerprint replica.
Figure 5.10: The image shows the discontinuities that interrupt the ow of ridges which
are the basis for most ngerprint authentication methods. Minutiae are the points at which
a ridge stops, and bifurcations are the points at which one ridge divides into two. Many
types of minutiae exist, including dots (very small ridges), islands (ridges slightly longer
than dots, occupying a middle space between two temporarily divergent ridges), ponds or
lakes (empty spaces between two temporarily divergent ridges), spurs (a notch protruding
from a ridge), bridges (small ridges joining two longer adjacent ridges), and crossovers (two
ridges which cross each other).
Methods which exploit intrinsic properties of a single impression study the skin per-
spiration phenomenon. The vitality indication can be found by using Wavelet Transform
and Fast Fourier Transform [9]. Wavelet analysis is able to capture the non-regular shape
typical of the ridges in an image acquired from a live nger. Images taken from articial
95
ngers show a more regular shape. Fourier Transform is employed to study the regular
periodicity of pores on the ridges in live ngerprints. Such a regularity is not present in
signals corresponding to spoof ngerprints. Liveness detection methods which search for
morphological characteristics of ngerprint images, are signicantly ecient when based on
the surface coarseness.
Below, we describe three static morphology-based methods which exploit a single nger-
print image for vitality information extraction and which have been used for comparison.
Each of them exploits a subset of the features we used in our algorithm.
Moon et al. [79] proposed a method based on analyzing the surface coarseness in high
resolution (1000dpi) ngertip images. It has been observed that the surface of a fake
nger is much coarser than the one of the human skin. The coarseness feature is measured
by computing the standard deviation of the residual noise of the ngerprint image. The
alternation of the ridges and valleys makes the ngertip surfaces intrinsically coarse because
the material used during the fabrication process is composed by molecules which tend to
agglomerate. Then, before feature extraction, the eect ridge/valley was minimized by using
a wavelet decomposition at dierent scales. In particular, the image is enhanced through
an histogram equalization and converted into a mono-dimensional signal representing the
gray level prole of the ridges. The decision is made by using a threshold value of 25. This
algorithm is fast and convenient but it works well only in presence of an high resolution
sensor (1000dpi, while the common commercial sensors present a resolution of about 500dpi)
[9].
An interesting texture-based approach using a single ngerprint image was proposed by
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Nikam [50]. They analyzed liveness of a ngerprint image by using the gray level associated
to the ngerprint pixels. The gray level distribution in a ngerprint image changes when
the physical structure changes. This information is quantied by using several texture
features. Real and fake ngerprint images present dierent textural properties useful for
vitality detection. Due to the presence of sweat pores and the perspiration phenomenon,
authentic ngerprints exhibit non-uniformity of gray levels along ridges, while due to the
characteristics of articial material surface, such as gelatin or silicon, spoof ngers show
high uniformity of gray levels along ridges. The gray level distribution of the single pixels is
modeled as rst order statistics, while the joint gray level function between pair of pixels is
modeled as second order statistics. The authors proposed Gabor lter-based features, since
ngerprint exhibit oriented texture-like pattern and Gabor lters can optimally capture
local frequency and orientation information. The basic steps of the adopted procedure are
listed as follows:
 Step1 : Fingerprint image is ltered using a bank of 4 Gabor lters oriented in 4
directions 0°, 45°, 90°and 135°.
 Step2 : A gray level co-occurrence matrix method is applied to ltered images to
extract textural details.
 Step3 : Dimensionality of the features is reduced by Principal Component Analysis
(PCA).
Features are used to train three dierent classiers: a Neural Network (NN), a Support
Vector Machine(SVM) and OneR. A Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) is used as NN and a
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Radial basis function (RBF) is used as the SVM kernel, with parameters C and  as 1 and
2:3, respectively. The three classiers are then fused using the "Max Rule". This approach
presents good performance when the core point is accurately located, (see Fig.5.10). How-
ever, existing core detection algorithms do not work well in presence of poor quality images
or with very dry or wet ngerprints, resulting in a noisy core.
An approach based on multiresolution texture analysis and the inter-ridge frequency
analysis of ngerprint images has been proposed by Abhyankar and Schuckers [2]. They
used dierent texture features to quantify how the gray level distribution in a ngerprint
image changes when the physical structure changes. First order statistics model the gray
level distribution of the single pixels by using histograms, while second order statistics refer
to the joint gray level function between pair of pixels. Two secondary features were used,
Cluster Shade and Cluster Prominence, based on the co-occurrence matrix. These features
derived from a multi-resolution texture analysis have been combined with features derived
from ngerprint local-ridge frequency analysis that was performed as well. The training
was performed separately for all the three scanners. Error rates have been computed after
processing the statistics and the local ridges frequencies features by using Fuzzy-C-means
classier. This algorithm does not depend on the perspiration phenomenon and it is able
to overcome the dependence on more than one ngerprint image. However, it presents
limitations in real scenarios, since the computation of the local-ridge frequencies may be
aected by cold weather and dierent skin conditions, including dirty ngers and wet ngers.
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5.2.3 The proposed approach
Among the approaches proposed in the scientic literature, methods which exploit a single
impression are cheaper and faster. None of the developed approaches alone can perfectly
separate fake and live ngerprints. The static features previously described are able to
capture dierent aspect of vitality,in particular morphology-based and perspiration-based
. Then, it is reasonable that a combination of them is expected to achieve better per-
formance than any of the individual measures. In the current investigation, we combine
both perspiration- and morphology-based static features to improve the vitality detection
accuracy.
Below we describe the considered morphology-based features.
 Residual noise of the ngerprint image: indicates the dierence between an original
and de-noised image, in which the noise components are due to the coarseness of
the fake nger surface [2]. Materials used to make fake ngers such as Silicon or
Gelatin consist of organic molecules which tend to agglomerate, thus the surface of
a live nger is generally smoother than an articial one [79]. In the present work,
the coarseness of the image can be measured by computing the standard deviation of
the residual noise of an image, where the amount of residual noise was computed by
using a wavelet-based approach. According to the approach proposed by Moon [79],
we have treated the surface coarseness as a kind of Gaussian white noise added to the
image. Firstly, the image was de-noised with a Symlet by applying a soft-threshold
for wavelet shrinkage. The noise residue was achieved by calculating the dierence
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between the two nger tip images before and after de-noising. The Noise Residue
Standard Deviation is a good indicator of texture coarseness since the pixel value
uctuation in the noise residue of a coarser surface texture is generally stronger.
 First order statistics: measure the likelihood of observing a gray value at a randomly-
chosen location in the image. The gray level associated to each pixel is exploited to
determine a vitality degree of the ngerprint image. They can be computed from
the histogram of pixel intensities in the image. The goal is to quantify the variations
of the gray level distribution when the physical structure changes. The distinction
between a fake and a live nger is based on the dierence of these statistics. If H(n)
indicates the normalized histogram and N the number of bin, the set of rst order
statistical properties used in this work are as follows [2]:
{ Energy:
e =
N 1X
n=0
H(n)2 (5.1)
{ Entropy:
s =  
N 1X
n=0
H(n)logH(n) (5.2)
{ Median:
M = argmin
a
X
n
H(n)jn  aj (5.3)
{ Variance:
2 =
NX
n=0
(n  )2H(n) (5.4)
100
{ Skewness:
1 =
1
3
N 1X
n=0
(n  )3H(n) (5.5)
{ Kurtosis:
2 =
1
4
N 1X
n=0
(n  )4H(n) (5.6)
{ Coecient of variation:
cv =


(5.7)
Below we describe the considered perspiration-based features.
 Individual pore spacing. Extensive research has shown that pore patterns are unique
to each individual [2]. A photo-micrograph of pores is shown in Figure 5.11. For
the purpose of the proposed approach, we focus on analyzing the occurrence of pores
that causes a gray value variability in the ngerprint image. This tendency can be
studied by using the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), then the ngerprint image has to
be transformed into a ridge signal, representing the gray-level value along the ridge.
The discrimination between a live nger and a fake one is performed in the space
of the total energy of the ridge signal. In this method, according to the algorithm
proposed in [56], the 2-dimensional ngerprint image was mapped to 1-dimensional
signal which represents the gray-level values along the ridges. This technique lets to
quantify the perspiration phenomenon in a given image. The gray-level variations
in the signal correspond to variations in moisture due to the pores and the presence
of perspiration. By transforming the signal in the Fourier domain lets to measure
this static variability in gray-level along the ridges. In particular, the focus is on
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frequencies corresponding to the spacial frequencies of the pores. Firstly, by using a
median lter the image was processed to remove noise and device eects. Such as de-
noised image was converted into a binary one. Second, a thinning routine was applied
on the binary image and the ngerprint ridge paths, composed by only one pixel, were
determined. Connections were removed to have only individual curves. Finally, the
FFT was computed and the total energy associated to the spacial frequency of the
pores was obtained as static feature. The coecients of interest are from 11 to 33,
since these values correspond to the spacial frequencies (0.4 - 1.2 mm) of pores. The
formula for this static measure SM is given from the following:
SM =
33X
k=11
f(k)2 (5.8)
where f(k) is expressed by the following:
f(k) =
Pn
i=1 j
P256
p=1 S
a
0i(p)e
 j2(k 1)(p 1)=256j
n
(5.9)
Sa0i = S0i  mean(S0i) (5.10)
where n is the total number of individual ridges and S0i is the i
th ridge.
 Intensity-based. From the intensity distribution perspective, among the 256 dierent
possible intensities, the spoof and cadaver ngerprints images are distributed in the
dark (<150) [71]. The current study uses image histograms showing the number
of pixels at each dierent intensity values found in the image and it focuses on the
gray level values along the ridge, represented by the ridge signal. We have computed
two particular features: i) Gray Level 1 ratio, corresponding to the ratio between the
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number of pixels having a gray level belonging to the range (150, 253) and the number
of pixels having a gray level belonging to the range (1, 149); ii) Gray Level 2 ratio,
corresponding to the ratio between the number of pixels having a gray level belonging
to the range (246, 256) and the number of pixels having a gray level belonging to
the range (1, 245). Moreover, we have analyzed the uniformity of gray levels along
ridge lines and the contrast between valleys and ridges. As Figure 5.12 shows, real
ngerprints exhibit non-uniformity of gray levels and high ridge/valley contrast values.
Then, the general variation in gray-level values of in a spoof ngerprint is less than
a live one. To capture this information we have computed as additional feature the
Gradient of the gray-level matrix of the image.
Figure 5.11: The image on the left shows a photo-graphical example of pores. The image
on the right is output from a high resolution sensor (1000dpi) that captures the location of
pores in detail. Both are taken from [20].
The time to perform the recognition process is a fundamental parameter which aects
the performance of the proposed system. A feature selection phase reduces the number of
features to be extracted and subsequently the time needed for feature extraction. We have
selected the subset of features with highest discriminant power on the training set by using
a Sequential Forward Selection technique. The feature selection was performed for each
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Figure 5.12: Gray level uniformity analysis in ngerprint images: high level value for a real
ngerprint and low for a spoof. The image was taken from [50]
sensor.
Dierent classiers have been trained, such as a Support Vector Machine, a Decision
Tree, a Multilayer Perceptron and a Bayesian classier. For each sensor, we have chosen
the classier with the highest accuracy on the training set.
5.2.4 Results and Discussion
Datasets
Our experimental phase was carried out by using three databases composed by live and spoof
ngerprint images. Each database refers to a dierent sensor (Biometrika, CrossMatch e
Identix ), see Table 3. They have been taken from the Liveness Detection Competition 2009
and each one of them is composed by two subsets, one for training and the other one for
testing the algorithm [42]. Biometrika training dataset is made up by 520 silicone images
and 520 live images (13 subjects x 20 acquisitions x 2 frames), with 2 time-series (0 sec and
5 sec). The corresponding test set is made up by 1440 silicone images and 1440 live images
(37 subjects x 20 acquisitions x 2 frames), with 2 time-series (0 sec and 5 sec). CrossMatch
training dataset is made up by 500 live images and 500 fake images produced by using
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Table 5.1: Datasets for training
Database Subjects Live Images Fake Images Frames
Biometrika 13 520 520 0 and 5 sec
Identix 35 375 375 0 and 2 sec
CrossMatch 63 500 500 0 and 2 sec
Table 5.2: Datasets for testing
Database Subjects Live Images Fake Images Frames
Biometrika 37 1440 1440 0 and 5 sec
Identix 125 1125 1125 0 and 2 sec
CrossMatch 191 1500 1500 0 and 2 sec
silicone, gelatin and Play-Doh, with 2 time-series (0 sec and 2 sec). The corresponding test
set is made up by 1500 live images and 1500 fake images produced by using Silicon, Gelatin
and Play-Doh, with 2 time-series (0 sec and 2 sec). Identix training dataset is made up
by 375 live images and 375 spoof images produced by using Silicon, Gelatin and Play-Doh,
with 2 time-series (0 sec and 2 sec). The corresponding test set is made up by 1125 live
images and 1125 spoof images produced by using Silicon, Gelatin and Play-Doh, with 2
time-series (0 sec and 2 sec). The details about the data collection are shown in the tables 1
and 2. In the three cases, the subjects using for training are dierent than those considered
for testing. Table 3 reports details about the sensors used for LivDet 2009 Competition.
Table 5.3: Fingerprint sensors used for LivDet 2009.
Sensors Model No. Resolution (dpi) Image size
Biometrika FX2000 569 (312x372)
Identix DFR2100 686 (720x720)
CrossMatch Verier 300 LC 500 (480x640)
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Performance of the proposed method
Firstly, we analyzed the ngerprint images in the space of the selected features. The Figures
5.13, 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16 correspond to the entropy, the mean, the variance and the
coecient of variation of the ngerprint image. These three rst statistics present a good
separability between the classes live and fake.
Figure 5.13: Entropy for live(blue line) and fake(red line) ngerprint images taken from
Biometrika database.
The standard deviation of the residual noise also presents a good separability, as the
Figure 5.17 shows.
Finally, Figure 5.18 and Figure 5.19 report the two intensity-based features, the Gray
Level 2 and the gradient of the ngerprint image.
The classication performance evaluation was performed by adopting the same param-
eters used during the Liveness Detection Competition 2009, dened as follows:
 Ferrlive: rate of misclassied live ngerprints.
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Figure 5.14: Mean for live(blue line) and fake(red line) ngerprint images taken from
Biometrika database.
 Ferrfake: rate of misclassied fake ngerprints.
In particular, the indicator of performance is given from the value e averaged on the three
databases Biometrika, CrossMatch and Identix. The value e is computed as follows:
e =
Ferrlive+ Ferrfake
2
(5.11)
Table 4 reports the average time needed for extracting each of the 12 features which has
been exploited in our approach. Table 5 reports the features selected for each sensor by us-
ing a Sequential Forward Selection technique. We also observed that, when each feature was
individually used, its discriminant power changed by varying the resolution of the images
and the size of the dataset, while the joint usage of both perspiration- and morphology-
based features showed a high discriminant power on all the considered databases. Moreover,
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Figure 5.15: Variance for live(blue line) and fake(red line) ngerprint images taken from
Biometrika database.
a subset composed by mean, gradient, standard deviation of the residual noise and the co-
ecient of variations has been selected. The average error rate achieved by the proposed
method is of 12.47%, as reported in Table 6. On Biometrika and Identix datasets, the
higher percentage accuracy has been achieved by using a Multilayer Perceptron, while on
CrossMatch dataset, the Decision Tree classier achieved the best performance. The per-
formance achieved by the best algorithm submitted to the LivDet09 Competition was of
14.67%, as reported in Table 7. Our approach reduced this average error with a low variance
on the three LivDet09 databases.
Performance of the existing methods
Table 8 reports the best performance of the method of Moon by varying the de-noising l-
ter. The ngertip images have been rst enhanced through a histogram equalization. Then
the de-noising was performed by adopting dierent lters. Median lter produces standard
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Table 5.4: Time required for extracting the proposed set of features on a Core Duo T8100
2,1 Ghz Intel Processor.
Feature Average Extraction Time
Energy 0.15 sec
Entropy 0.02 sec
Mean 0.02 sec
V ariance 0.02 sec
Skewness 0.06 sec
Kurtosis 0.06 sec
Coefficientofvariation 0.02 sec
NoiseResidueStd 0.59 sec
IndivPoreSpacing 1 sec
GrayLevel1 0.02 sec
GrayLevel2 0.02 sec
Gradient 0.06 sec
Table 5.5: Selected features for each database.
Feature Biometrika CrossMatch Identix
Morphology   based Energy x x
Morphology   based Entropy x x
Morphology   based Mean x x x
Morphology   based V ariance x x
Morphology   based Skewness x x
Morphology   based Kurtosis x x
Morphology   based CoefficientOfV ariation x x x
Morphology   based NoiseResidueStd x x x
Perspiration  based PoreSpacing x x
Perspiration  based GrayLevel1 x
Perspiration  based GrayLevel2 x x
Perspiration  based Gradient x x x
Table 5.6: Performance of the proposed algorithm.
Ferrlive Ferrfake e
Biometrika 12.20% 13.00% 12.60%
CrossMatch 17.40% 12.90% 15.20%
Identix 8.30% 11.0% 9.70%
Average 12.60% 12.30% 12.47%
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Figure 5.16: Coecient of variation for live(blue line) and fake(red line) ngerprint images
taken from Biometrika database.
deviation values similar to the value 25 employed in the approach proposed by Moon et al.,
while the Wavelet-based procedure presents lower values of the considered feature. Accord-
ing to the procedure proposed in [79], the wavelet shrinkage was performed by applying a
soft-threshold. The threshold assumes the lower value on the database CrossMatch having
the lower resolution (500dpi) and composed by image with poor quality. In our experiments,
we also used wavelet packets that work using high frequencies at each ltering of the image.
They seem to be good for ngerprint images that present the most of the components at
high frequencies. The time frequency analysis is performed by repeating the ltering of the
signal. At each lter step, the frequency domain is cut in the middle and the high-frequency
components are kept [75]. Wavelet packets are able to improve the classication accuracy
only when the resolution is high enough, on Identix database it increases from 61:80% to
64:10% using a Symlet wavelet and from 62:00% to 66:80%, in both cases the threshold value
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Figure 5.17: Standard deviation of the residual noise for live(blue line) and fake(red line)
ngerprint images taken from Biometrika database.
Table 5.7: Performance of the best algorithm submitted to the Liveness Detection Compe-
tition 2009.
Ferrlive Ferrfake e
Biometrika 15.60% 20.70% 18.20%
CrossMatch 14.40% 15.90% 15.20%
Identix 9.80% 11.30% 10.60%
Average 13.20% 16.10% 14.67%
is close to 1. On ngerprint images taken Identix, Meyer wavelet packet worked better than
the standard wavelet, while on the other two databases the usage of wavelet packets made
a performances decrease.
Table 9 and 10 show the performance of the methods proposed by Nikam and Abhyankar-
Schuckers respectively, on the three LivDet09 databases. The rst approach achieved the
lowest error rate, equal to 18.70%, on the CrossMatch having the lowest resolution, while the
second approach achieved the highest error rate, equal to 47.20%, on the Identix database
having the highest resolution [41].
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Table 5.8: Performance of the method of Moon on the three databases LivDet09 using a
Median lter for de-noising.
Threshold Ferrlive Ferrfake e
Biometrika 16.50 54.30% 24.80% 39.55%
CrossMatch 25.00 6.00% 70.00% 38.00%
Identix 16.50 31.20% 44.50% 37.85%
Avg 19.33 30.50% 46.43% 38.47%
Table 5.9: Performance of the method of Moon on the three databases LivDet09 using
Symlet wavelet for de-noising.
Threshold Ferrlive Ferrfake e
Biometrika 20.60 20.80% 25.00% 23.00%
CrossMatch 3:1 11 27.40% 19.60% 23.50%
Identix 10.50 74.70% 1.60% 38.20%
Avg 40.97% 15.40% 28.23%
Table 5.10: Performance of the method of Moon on the three databases LivDet09 using
Symlet wavelet packet for de-noising.
Threshold Ferrlive Ferrfake e
Biometrika 1.15 46.50% 8.80% 27.70%
CrossMatch 0.8 14.00% 52.60% 33.30%
Identix 1.1 30.10% 41.30% 35.90%
Table 5.11: Performance of the method of Moon on the three databases LivDet09 using
Meyer wavelet for de-noising.
Threshold Ferrlive Ferrfake e
Biometrika 20.9 20.80% 26.20% 23.50%
CrossMatch 0 45.00% 28.00% 36.50%
Identix 10.8 74.40% 1.30% 38.00%
Table 5.12: Performance of the method of Moon on the three databases LivDet09 using
Meyer wavelet packet for de-noising.
Threshold Ferrlive Ferrfake e
Biometrika 1.2 38.10% 15.00% 26.50%
CrossMatch 0.82 20.40% 38.80% 29.60%
Identix 1.1 43.20% 23.20% 33.20%
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Table 5.13: Accuracy of the method of Nikam on the three databases LivDet09.
MLP SVM OneR MaxRule
Biometrika 76.1% 73.6% 70.7% 76.46%
CrossMatch 70% 71.7% 67.5% 70.3%
Identix 76.4% 73.2% 64.8% 77.9%
Table 5.14: Performance of the method of Nikam (Max Rule) on the three databases
LivDet09.
Ferrlive Ferrfake e
Biometrika 14.30% 42.30% 28.30%
CrossMatch 19.00% 18.40% 18.70%
Identix 23.70% 37.00% 30.35%
Avg 19.00% 32.57% 25.78%
Table 5.15: Performance of the method of Abhyankar and Schuckers on the three databases
LivDet09.
Ferrlive Ferrfake e
Biometrika 24.20% 39.20% 31.70%
CrossMatch 39.75% 23.30% 31.53%
Identix 48.40% 46.00% 47.20%
Avg 37.45% 36.17% 36.81%
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Figure 5.18: Gray Level 2 for live(blue line) and fake(red line) ngerprint images taken
from Biometrika database.
5.3 Robustness of Liveness Detection Algorithms against New
Materials used for Spoong
In our previous experiments, the classier was trained by using features extracted from
fake samples made with all the materials available in each database. In particular, Gelatin,
Silicon and Play-Doh are the materials employed in both Identix and CrossMatch databases.
However, a good liveness detection algorithm is expected to be robust when the material
used to learn the fake class changes. This aspect is a challenging problem in ngerprint
liveness detection, since nowadays materials used for fraudulent spoof attacks are going
to become very sophisticated. In this section, we analyze the performance of the existing
liveness algorithms in scenarios reproducing the real conditions, where the material used to
attack the system is not a priori known.
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Figure 5.19: Gradient for live(blue line) and fake(red line) ngerprint images taken from
Biometrika database.
5.3.1 Existing methods employed for comparison
We compare our method to the most ecient approaches existing in the literature, which
are those proposed by Moon [79], Nikam [50], Shuckers and Abhyankar [2]. We also consid-
ered a perspiration-based method using the joint contribution of dynamic and static features
which was experimented by Tan and Schuckers [71]. They studied the perspiration phe-
nomenon from the intensity distribution perspective, by observing that live ngers present
a distinctive contrast between white (>250, ASCII gray level range 0:255) and dark (<20)
gray level, while spoof images have very small contrast dierence. The decision rules to
perform liveness classication is generated after considering static and dynamic features.
The static features used in this work are based on the following parameters:
S1 =
sum(151 : 254)
sum(0 : 150)
(5.12)
115
and
S2 = sum(151 : 254) (5.13)
The dynamic features are based on the dierence in the histogram distribution between
zero and fth second that is larger in live nger compared to spoof subjects. In the live
ngers, perspiration makes dry (white) regions between the pores moister (darker) in time.
This approach may present some limitations in cases of ngers too dry or too moist and
other perspiration disorders.
5.3.2 Experimental Results
In order to study the robustness of the existing liveness detection approaches with respect to
unknown materials used for producing fake ngers, we have carried out a further evaluation.
In our experiments, each system was trained by using spoof ngerprints realized with all
but one of the available materials, while the excluded material was used for testing. Table
4 reports the performance of the method proposed by our approach. In presence of high
resolution images, taken from the Identix database, the testing performed using Gelatin
and Silicon, when the training is performed by employing fake ngers made in Play-Doh,
gives rise to a good spoong recognition rate. Table 5 shows that the method proposed by
Moon et al. wrongly classies the majority of the fake ngerprints taken from CrossMatch
database, while for a higher resolution factor, such a method presents a better behavior in
presence of unknown materials using for spoong. Table 6 and 7 show that the variation
in fake materials does not signicantly aect the performance of both Nikam-Agarwal and
Abhyankar-Schuckers approaches, when the training set is only composed by samples made
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Table 5.16: Performance of the method proposed by Marasco and Sansone on CrossMatch
and Identix databases.
CrossMatch Identix
Gelatin P lay  Doh Silicon Gelatin P lay  Doh Silicon
Ferrlive 6.5% 5.7% 12.6% 3.8% 19.2% 9.7%
Ferrfake 25.9% 16.7% 10.0% 42.3% 5.5% 30.6%
e 16.2% 11.2% 11.3% 23.05% 12.35% 20.15%
Table 5.17: Performance of the method proposed by Moon et al. on CrossMatch and Identix
databases.
CrossMatch Identix
Gelatin P lay  Doh Silicon Gelatin P lay  Doh Silicon
Ferrlive 12.30% 15.00% 35.70% 45.20% 79.60% 40.80%
Ferrfake 63.10% 61.80% 47.30% 31.80% 4.20% 36.80%
e 37.70% 38.40% 41.50% 38.50% 41.90% 38.80%
with Gelatin. On the contrary, as reported in Table 8, the performance of the Tan-Schuckers
method seems quite dependent on the material as well as on the considered dataset.
As resumed in Table 9, when the material used to attack the system is not known during
the training, most of the algorithms decrease in performance. This conrms our claim that
the performance of liveness detection algorithms reported by the authors typically represents
an overestimate of that obtainable in real scenarios. Among the considered methods, the
one based on a single feature [79] is the most dependent on the use of unknown materials
for testing. Also the dynamic method proposed in [71] had a signicant decrement in
performance when classifying fake ngerprints realized with materials dierent from those
present in the training set. The other methods are instead more robust, and the one
proposed by our approach, which is based on a combination of multiple features, exhibited
the best average error e when the material used for testing is unknown at training time.
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Table 5.18: Performance of the method proposed by Nikam and Agarwal on CrossMatch
and Identix databases.
CrossMatch Identix
Gelatin P lay  Doh Silicon Gelatin P lay  Doh Silicon
Ferrlive 27.20% 43.70% 24.20% 23.50% 29.30% 20.00%
Ferrfake 22.00% 32.90% 31.60% 16.00% 28.80% 31.50%
e 24.60% 38.30% 27.90% 19.75% 29.05% 25.75%
Table 5.19: Performance of the method proposed by Abhyankar and Schuckers on Cross-
Match and Identix databases.
CrossMatch Identix
Gelatin P lay  Doh Silicon Gelatin P lay  Doh Silicon
Ferrlive 45.80% 29.80% 58.60% 65.50% 61.60% 37.90%
Ferrfake 12.20% 24.40% 17.00% 2.40% 46.40% 27.70%
e 29.00% 27.10% 37.80% 33.45% 54.00% 32.80%
Table 5.20: Performance of the method proposed by Tan and Schuckers on CrossMatch and
Identix databases.
CrossMatch Identix
Gelatin P lay  Doh Silicon Gelatin P lay  Doh Silicon
Ferrlive 38.60% 24.40% 54.80% 64.10% 36.00% 38.80%
Ferrfake 32.20% 39.20% 43.00% 28.70% 42.40% 13.20%
e 35.40% 31.80% 48.90% 46.40% 39.20% 26.00%
Table 5.21: Performance of the analyzed approaches in terms of the average error e on
Identix and CrossMatch databases.
Marasco-Sansone Moon et al. Nikam-Agar. Abh.-Sch. Tan-Sch.
Gelatin 19.63% 38.10% 22.18% 31.23% 40.90%
Play-Doh 11.78% 40.15% 33.68% 40.55% 35.50%
Silicon 15.73% 40.15% 26.83% 35.30% 37.45%
Avg 15.71% 39.47% 27.53% 35.79% 37.45%
All materials 12.45% 30.85% 24.53% 39.37% 29.20%
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5.4 Evaluation of Fingerprint Liveness Detection Algorithms
in a Fusion Scheme
5.4.1 Verication Scenario
In this section, we investigated whether incorporating a ngerprint liveness detection in a
fusion scheme, under spoof attacks, may lead up to performance improvement. Our analysis
involves the simple score sum and the statistical Likelihood Ratio test.
Sum of scores
The experiments were carried out on the Nist, Biosecure and WVU databases, described
in the previous chapters 3 and 4. As said in Section 5.1, when considering a multimodal
biometric system working in presence of a spoof attack, the worst case is obtained by the
exact coincidence between the fake-live match score and the live-live match score. Then, it is
important to evaluate the system performance under the assumption that, live-spoof match
scores are similarly distributed as live-live match scores. Thus, we simulated each unimodal
spoof attack by substituting a genuine match score in place of an impostor match score.
We evaluated the performance of a multimodal system composed by face and ngerprint
traits under normal operation (i.e., without spoong), when only the ngerprint trait is
spoofed and when only the face trait is spoofed. Further, we simulated the integration of
our liveness detection algorithm in the fusion scheme, based on Ferrlive and Ferrfake
percentages. The spoofed modalities, as assessed by the incorporated algorithm, do not
have to give any contribution to the nal decision. Ferrfake indicates the percentage
of spoofed scores (impostor substituted by genuine) that have to be reset, while (100% -
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Ferrlive) indicates the percentage of genuine scores that have to be reset in the score sum
rule. When one modality is spoofed, the presence of the liveness detection algorithm helps a
SFAR reduction, since SFAR value of 10 3. This improvement is more signicant when the
algorithm is applied to both ngerprint modalities. We performed 10 iterations by randomly
varying the set of fake samples detected by the algorithm. The average performance is
reported in Fig.5.20. This plot shows that the SFAR reduction can be achieved since very
low SFAR values 10 3. Finally, the procedure was experimented also for the sum among
four modalities (see Fig.?? and Fig.5.21). The EER point corresponds to 2.96% xed on the
curve without spoong, for this FRR value, when only one ngerprint modality is spoofed,
SFAR becomes equal to 87.75%. Incorporating our ngerprint liveness detection algorithm
in the fusion scheme, aids to signicantly decrease SFAR to a value of 8.20%. When two
ngerprint modalities are spoofed, SFAR becomes equal to 96.91%. Here, incorporating our
ngerprint liveness detection algorithm for both spoofed modalities in the fusion scheme,
aids to achieve a SFAR value of 5.03%.
The same experiments were carried out on Biosecure database, where three ngerprint
modalities and one face were available (see Fig.5.23 and Fig.5.25); The EER point corre-
sponds to 0.19% xed on the curve without spoong, for this FRR value, when only one
ngerprint modality is spoofed, SFAR becomes equal to 71.69%. Incorporating our nger-
print liveness detection algorithm in the fusion scheme, aids to signicantly decrease SFAR
to a value of 0.01%. When two ngerprint modalities are spoofed, SFAR becomes equal to
96.03%. Here, incorporating our ngerprint liveness detection algorithm for both spoofed
modalities in the fusion scheme, aids to achieve a SFAR value of 0.20%. and on WVU
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Figure 5.20: Average performance of the score sum between two ngerprint modalities
taken from the Nist database over 10 iterations, where the ngerprint modalities have been
spoofed.
database, where four ngerprint modalities and one face were available (see Fig.5.26 and
Fig.5.27). The EER point corresponds to 0.19% xed on the curve without spoong, for
this FRR value, when only one ngerprint modality is spoofed, SFAR becomes equal to
28.18%. Incorporating our ngerprint liveness detection algorithm in the fusion scheme,
aids to signicantly decrease SFAR to a value of 0.62%. When two ngerprint modalities
are spoofed, SFAR becomes equal to 79.64%. Here, incorporating our ngerprint liveness
detection algorithm for both spoofed modalities in the fusion scheme, aids to achieve a
SFAR value of 0.004%.
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Figure 5.21: Average performance of the score sum between two ngerprint modalities and
two face modalities taken from the Nist database over 10 iterations, where the ngerprint
modalities have been spoofed.
Summary
In this chapter, we have investigated a multimodal system composed of face and ngerprint
modalities under dierent spoof attack scenarios. The experiments showed that, the mul-
timodal systems present a high probability to be deceived by spoong only one or a subset
of its modalities. We have also proposed a novel ngerprint liveness detection algorithm
which combines morphology- and perspiration- based features. The proposed algorithm has
been tested on three dierent types of sensor technologies.
Our experiments demonstrated that, in presence of low resolution ngerprint images,
it overcomes the limitations of the existing approaches. The overall system will also be
faster, since the required information can be extracted from only one image without asking
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Figure 5.22: Performance of the score sum between three ngerprint modalities and one
face modality taken from Biosecure database.
the user to scan twice his nger. Moreover, since our method does not require additional
hardware, the cost of the ngerprint sensor does not increase.
Our experiments demonstrated also that, the performance of liveness detection ap-
proaches in which only one feature is exploited, decreases in presence of new materials
employed for spoong. This weakness is reduced when multiple vitality features are ex-
tracted. In particular, the combination of morphology- and perspiration-based features
showed a high robustness in such a real scenario.
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Figure 5.23: Performance of the score sum between three ngerprint modalities and one
face modality taken from Biosecure database, over 10 iterations.
Figure 5.24: Performance of the score sum between three ngerprint modalities and one
face modality taken from Biosecure database, where the three ngerprint modalities have
been spoofed.
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Figure 5.25: Performance of the score sum between three ngerprint modalities and one
face modality taken from Biosecure database, where the three ngerprint modalities have
been spoofed, over 10 iterations.
Figure 5.26: DET curve of the score sum involving one face and four ngerprint modalities
taken from WVU database.
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Figure 5.27: ROC curve of the score sum involving one face and four ngerprint modalities
taken from WVU database.
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